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 Abstract 
 
This article considers the role of mental time travel in human evolution.  A central  
thesis is that other primates, although having memory and expectation, do not possess  
the same ability to live in the past or in the future.  The first half of this paper argues  
that reconstructive access to the past (i.e. episodic memory) is dependent on other  
advanced cognitive capabilities (e.g. self-awareness and meta-representation) and  
focuses on the results of recent `theory of mind' research in order to evaluate the  
thesis.  Mental simulation is the proposed underlying mechanism for the development  
of both mindreading and mental time travel.  The second half contrasts flexible  
awareness of possible futures with other forms of `anticipatory behaviour' and reviews  
evidence about how far other primates may think ahead.  The phylogenetic history of  
mental time travel and its adaptive and exaptive relationships to other features are  
discussed.  Mental access to the fourth dimension is essential for many of the  
distinctive characteristics of our species.   
 
 
 
 
 Preface 
      
     "If martians have been observing the development of the blue-green planet called  
Earth, they would have noticed the extraordinary, exponentially growing changes  
during the last millennia.  One component of this planet, the species Homo sapiens  
sapiens, would have been easily recognized by the martians as the cause of these  
changes.  Even more astonishing to the hypothetical martians than the tremendous  
effects humans have on the environment, would have been the human capability to  
commit global suicide" (Suddendorf, 1992, p.4).  Hence, martian scientists might ask  
themselves what distinguishes humans from all the other creatures this planet  
produced?  Most of humans' closest relatives, the other great apes, continue to behave  
calmly.  So, what enabled and motivated humans to change the face of the Earth?   
     These are the great questions that puzzled me, and many before me, for a long  
time.  The last two years I have tried to research and evaluate our knowledge in  
respect to a potential answer that so far was mainly neglected.  The answer I advocate  
in this thesis is that humans, unlike other animals, developed a mental access to the  
fourth dimension: our awareness of past and future.  The argument comprises recent  
findings in cognitive psychology, comparative psychology, developmental  
psychology, evolutionary psychology and primatology, and touches on many  
neighbouring fields such as archaeology and neurophysiology.  Most issues raised are  
worth separate essays, but in the light of the scope of this paper and the variety of  
issues relevant, many topics can be illuminated only briefly (and some could only be  
pointed out in form of footnotes).  This may be the price one has to pay if one does  
not focus on a specific detail but rather tries to bring together interdisciplinary  
knowledge in pursuit of the `larger picture'.    
     This picture is nonetheless confined to the `mental time travel' aspect of human  
evolution and I would like to urge those who try to reconstruct an even broader picture  
of human evolution to include this aspect.  The argument is written in article style and  
indeed, has been submitted for publication.  Because I did not want to disrupt this  
theoretical contribution, I decided to add the preliminary results of a survey I started  
in April 1993 in form of an Appendix (A).  Furthermore, in Appendix B I suggest an  
experimental paradigm that may be able to put some of the ensuing questions to test.   
Both Appendices (A & B) are a substantial part of the thesis work and I would like to  
encourage readers to go through those in addition to the main body.      
     Questions that were once philosophical are now beginning to yield to scientific  
inquiry, and I hope that, even if the material requires some mental effort, some of the  
excitement of this enterprise is conveyed in this thesis. 
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 Introduction 
 
 We humans have long attributed to ourselves special qualities of mind, spirit  
or morality that are denied all other creatures.  Religions seem to play a special role in  
this by bestowing uniquely upon us an immortal soul or by tracing our origins to some  
divine act of creation. [Corballis, 1991, p.3] 
 
     What is the essential difference between humans and other creatures on planet  
Earth?  Even after the general acceptance of the theory of evolution, when humans  
acknowledged having common ancestors with all other species, we put ourselves at  
the top of the ladder, standing in solitary splendour far above all other species. 
     This conceit may of course be regarded as a `false consensus bias' (Ross, Green &  
House, 1977) created by western scholars who were raised under the influence of the  
Christian tradition, which perpetuates an unbridgeable gap separating humans from  
animals.  There are, however, other perspectives and influential philosophical and  
religious traditions that emphasize the continuity rather than discontinuity of human  
evolution.  Hinduism, for example, views animal and human minds as stages that  
differ in merely quantitative fashion in the continued progression towards Nirvana.   
     Features that the western scientific enterprise assumed to be uniquely human only a  
few years ago (e.g. symbolic thinking, tool use, self-awareness) have been shown to  
exist, at least to a degree, in nonhuman great apes, too (e.g. Greenfield & Savage- 
Rumbaugh, 1990; Goodall, 1986; Gallup, 1983)1.  In order to uphold the belief in an  
unbridgeable gap separating humans from animals, researchers of the last decades  
have been continuously forced to pose increasingly more restrictive (or less elegant)  
definitions of humanity or of supposedly uniquely human qualities, such as language  
(Gibson, 1990).  An example of this trend has to do with the one-time belief that only  
humans use tools.  In the face of increasing evidence to the contrary, it was then  
proposed that only humans manufacture tools, and more recently still that only  
humans use tools to manufacture tools (e.g. Beck, 1980)2.  
     Recent evidence suggests that some great apes, in contrast to monkeys, may have  
at least a rudimentary3 `theory of mind' (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Premack,  
1988), may be able to use pedagogy in both laboratory (Fouts, Fouts & van Cantfort,  
1989) and field (Boesch, 1991) contexts, may show empathy and compassion  
(Boesch, 1992), may be able to truly imitate (Byrne, in press; Meador, Rumbaugh,  
Pate & Bard, 1987), and may have the ability (possibly underlying all those above) to  
imagine other possible worlds (Byrne & Whiten, 1992).  These `discoveries' reveal  
more and more a picture of apes as the `missing link' bridging the gap between the  
animal kingdom and humanity.  One could be even tempted to re-locate this `gap', so  
that it separates the great apes, rather than only humans, from all other animals. 
     Nevertheless, it can still be argued that there is a substantial gap between humans  
and the other great apes, if only because of the extraordinary impact we have had on  
the environment.  As Passingham (1982) puts it: 
      
 Our species is unique because, in only 35000 years or so, we have  
revolutionized the face of the Earth. We have created entirely new environments for  
ourselves, have changed the lives of animals, and have the power to threaten the  
existence of life on our planet. [p.21] 
 
The present article will elaborate on this `something extra' that the great ape `homo'  
exhibits.  I expect that the debate about whether it constitutes a continuity or  
discontinuity in phylogeny will eventually become immaterial, in the way the nature- 
nurture debate turned out to be.  Depending on the philosophical emphasis implicit in  
the theoretical filter through which one views it, one may classify human evolution  
either as a discontinuity or a continuity, although the two may not be mutually  
exclusive. 
     Apparent discontinuities or the impression of qualitative differences can result  
from continuous gradual changes in phylogeny, in the way that H2O changes  
`qualitatively' from ice to water to gas as temperature continuously and quantitatively  
increases.  These types of changes might be best described by the term metamorphosis  
(Bischof, 1985).  The crucial evolutionary concept of exaptation (e.g. Gould, 1991;  
Gould & Vbra, 1982) might have been the underpinning of such a metamorphotic  
change in human evolution:  A gradually evolved adaptive feature may have had a  
variety of `side' characteristics that were not directly relevant to the survival of the  
organism, but at a later point in phylogeny these characteristics may have become the  
basis for new strains of adaptation.  In their theory of "punctuated equilibrium"  
Eldredge and Gould (1972) argued that major phylogenetic changes may occur in  
short periods of time producing an apparent discontinuity in the fossil record and  
among living species.  The seemingly qualitative differences between humans and  
other animals might have been the result of a metamorphotic change that gave new  
fitness value to a variety of phylogenetic older features.  This may have rapidly  
changed humans some time during the last 5 to 8 million years, after the phylogenetic  
split from the line that led to the modern chimpanzees.   
     In this article I want to re-introduce into the debate an aspect of human thought,  
rather than morphology, whose phylogenetic emergence might have had such a  
profound significance that it could have been a prime mover in human evolution:  the  
discovery of the dimension of time.  
     Wolfgang Koehler (1917/1927) anticipated with his work many of the `recent  
discoveries' about the mentality of apes.  Contrary to the prevailing Zeitgeist, Koehler  
emphasized the relatively sophisticated mental capacities of chimpanzees, but he also  
noted an important limitation:  
 
 `The time in which the chimpanzee lives' is limited in past and future"  
[Koehler, 1917/1927, p.272]. 
 
We humans, by contrast, seem to be able to concern ourselves with issues that are not  
limited in past or future.  Events as remote as the crucifixion of Christ can be very  
important to us, and we even tackle questions about the extent of time itself by  
developing religious or scientific concepts like `genesis', `big bang' or `judgment day'.   
Indeed, most of what is written or talked about refers to something that has happened  
in the past or could happen in the future; the present appears to be just a brief segment  
passing from the future into the past.  While life is always happening in this present,  
our cognition, emotion, motivation and behaviour is largely influenced by what we  
believe has happened or may happen.  Humans can `mentally travel in time'; we can  
use our imaginations to represent events of past and future and reflect upon them.   
Clearly, animals have some sort of memory and expectations, but their ability to  
mentally travel in time may be significantly limited.  
     The human ability to mentally travel in time is central to the interpretation of  
human evolution that is presented here.  In particular, I will argue that our ability to  
anticipate the future, based on our access to the past, has changed human motivation,  
emotion, cognition, and behaviour, and was one of the major forces that led us to  
change the very face of the Earth.  Perhaps we need to improve this ability even more  
if we are to survive the rapid changes we have produced recently. 
     The purposes of this article are to highlight mental time travel as an important  
human condition, to determine whether it is uniquely human, to propose a possible  
underlying mechanism, to assess its phylogenetic and ontogenetic development and to  
discuss its adaptive or exaptive relationship to other human characteristics.  First I  
discuss mental time travel into the past and then mental time travel into the future. 
 
 
 
 
 Mental Time Travel into the Past 
 
     It seems reasonable to argue that in order to imagine a past that lies before their  
own lifetimes, people must have evolved the means to represent (remember) events of  
their own past.  Many scientists have argued for fundamental differences between  
animal and human memory (e.g. Aristotle; Bischof, 1985; Gardner, 1975 cited in  
Marshall, 1982; Marshall, 1982; Tulving, 1983).  But since animals can obviously  
learn from past experiences, it might be thought that human and animal memory differ  
only in degree.  However, research in different areas (e.g. psychology, philosophy,  
artificial intelligence; see Polster, Nadel & Schacter, 1991, for a recent historical  
review) suggests that memory consists of multiple systems that may be functionally  
and structurally distinct (although alternative views exist, see for example Roediger,  
1990), and this raises the possibility that one or more of these memory systems may  
be an acquisition unique to humans.  
 
 
A Uniquely Human Memory System? 
 
     Research on the phenomena of amnesia, in particular the extensive studies of the  
patient H.M., forced psychologists to distinguish between different kinds of memory,  
because one type of memory can be impaired while another continues to function  
normally.  Despite his memory loss, H.M.'s behaviour can be influenced by the past  
without him being aware of it (see Ogden & Corkin, 1991, for a recent review).  The  
spared learning or memory abilities, as reflected in learned skills, classical and  
operant conditioning, priming, habituation and sensitization, affect performance  
without affording an `image/picture of the past' (Koehler, 1917/1927), a `recollective  
experience' (Gardiner, 1991) or `access' to the experience that is affecting current  
performance (Zola-Morgan & Squire, 1990).  While there is ample evidence that  
animals rely extensively on information stored in this implicit fashion, there is  
considerable debate about whether animals possess the memory systems that are  
impaired in global amnesia.  These are semantic and episodic memory (see Ogden &  
Corkin, 1991; Squire, 1992).  Tulving (1972, 1983), who proposed the dissociation  
between semantic and episodic memory, saw these as functionally separate although  
interacting systems.  Semantic memory comprises context-free knowledge or facts  
about the world and episodic memory comprises personal experiences and events  
(Tulving, 1983).  Consolidation of both kinds of information appears to be dependent  
on the hippocampus and related structures (Squire, 1992).  Rats, monkeys and humans  
seem to have similar hippocampus-dependent memory systems (Squire, 1992), but  
this similarity might be due to a shared ability to store semantic facts, rather than  
episodes.   
     Ridley (1992) argued that semantic memory exists in animals such as vervet  
monkeys, because these animals apparently represent not-perceptually-present facts  
about their social world.  The distress call of an isolated infant, for instance, leads the  
mother to look to her infant whereas other mothers look to the mother (see Cheney &  
Seyfarth, 1990, for further examples).  Evidence for episodic memory, the memory of  
personal experiences associated with past points in time, seems to be more difficult to  
find for animals, and Tulving (1983) himself went so far as to suggest that episodic  
memory may be uniquely human. 
     This suggestion did not stay unchallenged, however.  Olton (1984) and earlier  
Roitblat (1982) pointed out that animals display certain behaviour, as in a trial of a  
delayed conditioned-discrimination task, or in foraging where an animal must  
remember not to go to the same flower twice to obtain nectar, which indicates that  
"remnants" of a previous experience allow it to affect later behaviour.  Thus, the  
animal "represents" a past event and, according to Olton (1984), therefore possesses  
episodic memory. 
     However, Dretske (1982) argued that this inference is not unambiguous.  If event  
A leads to the change B in the cognitive apparatus of an animal and B affects  
behaviour C at a later point in time, then B does not necessarily carry any information  
about A itself, and may therefore not be a true representation of A.  The mediator B  
might be `causal' rather than `informational'; "that is, that the memory trace of the  
stored event only contains instruction for future behavior, without any information  
that would permit the reconstruction of the past" (Tulving, 1984, p.258).  The fact that  
animals can `recognize' objects that they have seen only once before could be a result  
of a feeling of familiarity rather than of a remembrance of that event (Ridley, 1992).   
In his reply to Olton's critique Tulving accepts that animals may have a form of  
episodic memory that serves at least as a causal mediator, and in fact Olton's examples  
meet many and violate none of the criteria Tulving (1983) laid out for episodic  
memory.  However, Tulving maintains that animals may not be able to "mentally  
travel back in time to recollect and reminisce the way humans do" and illustrates his  
position by rhetorically asking "was Aristotle wrong when he said that, `Many  
animals have memory and are capable of instruction, but no other animal except man  
can recall the past at will'...?" (Tulving, 1984, p.258). 
     If one accepts Dretske (1982) and Tulving's (1984) argument that learning from  
single events does not constitute evidence for representations of the past, it appears as  
yet impossible to show that animals travel mentally into the past even if they actually  
do so.  It is however possible to further analyze the possibility of mental time travel in  
animals indirectly by considering related mental capacities.   
 
 
Mental Capacities and Mental Time Travel 
    
     Tulving (1985) argued that different kinds of consciousness characterize different  
memory systems.  Procedural (here termed implicit) memory implies anoetic  
(nonknowing) consciousness, semantic memory implies noetic (knowing)  
consciousness, and episodic memory implies autonoetic (self-knowing)  
consciousness.  Although it is not clear whether these types of consciousness are, as  
Tulving argued, properties of the memory systems themselves (Schacter, 1989, for  
example, argued for separate memory and consciousness modules), they appear to be  
interlinked.  Episodic memory contains information about past states of one's self and  
of the world.  On the one hand, in providing autobiographical information about one's  
own past, memory of past events (episodic memory) provides the basis for one's  
personal identity. On the other hand, in order to attribute representations to  
experiences of self at an earlier point in time one may need to be aware of one's self in  
the present (cf. Howe & Courage, 1993), an ability that only chimpanzees (e.g.  
Gallup, 1970), orangutans (e.g. Suarez & Gallup, 1981) and a gorilla (Patterson,  
1991)4 have demonstrated through self-recognition in a mirror5.  Monkeys and even  
elephants can learn how a mirror works, but, in contrast to the great apes, they cannot  
locate markings viewed in a mirror if these markings are on their own bodies (Gallup,  
1983; Povinelli, 1989).  If one cannot consciously (autonoetically) recognize the self  
in the present (e.g. in the mirror), how could one possibly recognize the self in the  
past?  In order to understand that current mental images can represent one's own  
earlier experiences, one needs to have a concept of self that allows for such inferences.   
It might be objected that it is not necessary to postulate the need for metacognitions  
such as the inference that representations are experiences of the self in the past,  
because memories of past events could reveal themselves without them.  But, as I will  
show in the following paragraphs, memory for past episodes, unlike memory for facts,  
does imply metacognitions in that it involves active reconstruction and attribution,  
and is therefore as much a function of the present as a record of the past. 
     The term memory is often associated with a fixed databank (e.g. library) but this  
metaphor appears to be more appropriate for semantic knowledge (memory for facts)  
than for episodic memory.  In contrast to the retrieval of facts, retrieval of past  
episodes usually recodes (`updates') the stored information (Tulving, 1984)6.   
Retrieval of past episodes appears to be more than `opening and reading a file'; the  
past episodes need to be reconstructed.  
     Almost a century ago Freud (1895, cited in Marshall, 1982) noted that even  
memories that reveal themselves as images require a story grammar if remembrance is  
to be distinguished from random hallucinations.  However, the storyline is often  
reconstructed on the basis of one's general knowledge rather than what actually  
happened (e.g. Bartlett, 1932) and may therefore not be part of the memory trace7. 
     The order of past events in time seems not to be a property of memory.  After  
reviewing the evidence Friedman concluded recently that  
 
 [i]n spite of the common intuition that chronology is a basic property of  
autobiographical memory, the research reviewed demonstrates that there is no single,  
natural temporal code in human memory. Instead, a chronological past depends on a  
process of active, repeated construction [Friedman, 1993, p.44]8.  
 
     The reconstruction of time and storyline presupposes that one is aware of the  
`pastness' of the current representations.  In other words, in order to reconstruct  
episodes one needs to be able to make the basic distinction between representations of  
the past (memories) and representations of the present (e.g. hallucinations,  
perceptions).  But even this basic quality appears not to be inherent in memory, that is,  
memories seem not to be marked as memories.  On the one hand, there are plenty of  
examples of confabulation, the experience of remembering without the existence of  
corresponding memory representations (see, for example, Bowers & Hilgard, 1986).   
We frequently `remember' events that did not happen (or at least not in the way we  
recall them).  On the other hand, it has been shown that "[h]aving - and even using - a  
memory representation of a prior event is not sufficient to insure the subjective  
experience of remembering" (Jacoby, Kelley & Dywan, 1989, p.417).  A feeling of  
`pastness' appears not to be a property of the memory representation, but has to be  
inferred and attributed (or, in the case of confabulation, misattributed) to the current  
representation (Jacoby, Kelley & Dywan, 1989).  However, it is this subjective  
experience of the `pastness' of representations, not the objective validity of memory  
(as usually investigated in human and animal research), on which the ability to  
mentally travel into one's own past rests.  Thus, what Tulving (1983, 1984) called  
episodic memory is as much dependent on present mental abilities as on memory  
storage of the past.  What appears to be required is a concept of self and the ability to  
form meta- or second-order representations of one's own knowledge. 
     In order to travel mentally back in time, i.e. to attribute representations to  
experiences of the self in the past and reconstruct these representations into episodes,  
one needs to have access to the content of one's own mind (cf. Ridley, 1992).  In  
addition to the primary representation (e.g. I am in a park), one has to represent this  
representation as a memory.  Other primary representations that are represented as  
memories (e.g. I go shopping and I play ball) can be reconstructed into a past episode  
(e.g. I was in a park, played ball and then went shopping) which may afford further  
metacognitions.  The ability to voluntarily (selectively) choose what events of the past  
are internally generated is a characteristic of human mental time travel that even more  
strongly demands flexible access to one's own mind.  
 
 
The Mentality of Primates 
 
     Do animals have an awareness about the contents of their own minds?  Cheney and  
Seyfarth (1990) argue that monkeys do not recognize and represent their own  
knowledge.  Monkeys do not entertain metacognitions of their own states of mind.   
Just as people with `blindsight' do not know (are not consciously aware) that they  
have vision, monkeys may not know what they know, or even that they know (e.g.  
Gallup, 1983; Humphrey, 1986).  Since the subjective experience of remembering  
seems not to be evoked by the memory trace itself, some animals may have  
representations of past events without the awareness (knowing, representing) that  
these representations are past experiences and consequently without the possibility to  
actively reconstruct these representations into narrative episodes. 
     But how can we know whether or not animals form second-order representations of  
their own mental states?  We can only infer from observable behaviour.  Behavioural  
available only for chimpanzees and perhaps the other great apes (Whiten and Byrne,  
1991).  This evidence comprises observations indicating behaviour such as pretend  
based on the ability to form meta-representations. 
     The question whether or not animals can attribute mental states such as  
remembering to themselves might be best assessed by examining the growing body of  
data concerning the attribution of mental states to others (cf. next section).  Since  
Premack and Woodruff's (1978) original article on whether chimpanzees have a  
`theory of mind', research on animals' and children's conceptions of mind has boomed.   
I will review some of the research results that are important for mental time travel. 
     A `complete' theory of mind, such as that possessed by adult humans, is expressed  
by being able to attribute mental states to one's self (e.g. do I desire, intend, believe or,  
according to the previous argument, remember X?) and to others (e.g. does she desire  
or believe X or Y?) even when there is a discrepancy between one's own and other's  
knowledge (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990).  A complete theory of mind does not evolve in  
a single step, whether in phylogeny or in ontogeny, but is better described by gradual  
differences between species and between developmental stages.  The ostrich that  
buries its head in the sand is apparently intellectually unable to take the visual  
perspective of others.  However, Kummer, for example, observed a female baboon  
apparently hiding parts of her body (i.e. her hands that were grooming a subadult  
male) from the male leader, implying that she was able to mentally take the male's  
visual perspective (Kummer, 1990, record 56 in Byrne & Whiten, 1990).  This does  
not necessarily imply an attribution of a mental state resulting from seeing.  But an  
understanding of that another's visual perspective differs from one's own might be  
viewed as a phylogenetic step into that direction (cf. Whiten, 1991).   
     There appears to be little evidence indicating that monkeys attribute mental states,  
i.e. that they are aware of others' or their own intentions, beliefs or knowledge  
(Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990).  Rhesus monkeys, for example, fail to comprehend what  
another individual knows as a result of seeing.  They choose randomly between the  
advice of those trainers who saw the baiting of one of several containers that were  
invisible to them and those who could not have seen it (Povinelli, Parks & Novak,  
1991).  Chimpanzees, however, learn to pick the individual who can help solve the  
task (Povinelli, Nelson & Boysen, 1990; Premack, 1988).  Besides understanding  
visual perspective in this case it appears necessary to attribute resulting states of mind  
(knowledge). 
     Similar discrepancies between the performance of chimpanzees and monkeys in  
the realms of deception (Byrne & Whiten, 1990, 1992), teaching (Boesch, 1991; Fouts  
et al., 1989) and imitation (Byrne, in press; Meador et al., 1987) may also be due to  
chimpanzees' superior skills in attributing mental states (Byrne, in press; Cheney &  
Seyfarth, 1990).  Imitation, for example, is not evident in monkeys in spite of the  
popular belief that monkeys are notorious imitators.  Recent reviews attribute  
monkeys' social learning to `lower level' mechanisms such as stimulus enhancement  
and social facilitation, while they accept the evidence for `true' imitation in great apes  
(Byrne, in press; Meador, et al., 1987).  Monkeys may not truly imitate because they  
cannot impute motives (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990) and because they may not be able  
to mentally take other's roles (Byrne, in press).  In a cooperation task devised by  
Povinelli, Parks and Novak (1992) monkeys learned their part without gaining  
knowledge about the contingent role of the other participant.  This can be inferred  
from the observation that in a role-reversal condition the monkeys did not show  
positive transfer effects from their prior experience in the other role.  By contrast,  
chimpanzees were able to assume the other's role when they were reversed (Povinelli,  
Nelson & Boysen, 1992).  
     These and other observations substantiate the view that only chimpanzees (and  
perhaps the other great apes) have some meta-representational understanding of, or  
awareness about, the nature of mind (see Suddendorf, 1993, for a comprehensive  
review of the evidence).  Sceptical reviews (e.g. Heyes, 1993) nevertheless maintain  
that none of the recent efforts has provided convincing evidence for mental state  
attribution in animals.  Heyes (1993) argues that the observed behaviour of apes could  
be explained by learning processes that do not entail the attribution of mental states.   
If Heyes is right, then there would be no reason to believe that any animal can  
reconstruct past episodes, because no species has provided evidence for the required  
awareness about contents of their own or other minds.  But the consistent discrepancy  
between the performances of monkeys and great apes on varied measures has  
convinced many scholars that our closest relatives seem superior at attributing mental  
states, rather than merely at learning (e.g. Byrne & Whiten, 1992; Cheney & Seyfarth,  
1990; Povinelli, 1993; Premack, 1988; Suddendorf, 1993).  
     Yet, the consistent discrepancy between the performances of great apes and adult  
humans also ensures that even if chimpanzees can make attributions, these attributions  
are limited in a number of respects (Premack, 1988).  There is experimental evidence  
suggesting that chimpanzees, in contrast to most other animals, can understand that  
others may differ in what they see (Premack, 1988), what they intend and desire  
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978) and what they know (Povinelli, Nelson & Boysen,  
1990).  However, there is no evidence suggesting that chimpanzees can  
simultaneously represent their own knowledge and different knowledge of others (see  
Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990; Premack, 1988).  The understanding of false beliefs (see  
Wimmer & Perner, 1983) seems to indicate a marked conceptual shift in children's  
(three and a half to four years) understanding of mind (e.g. Gopnik, 1993; Wellman,  
1991; see below).  Chimpanzees have not provided evidence for reaching this level of  
mental attribution, but investigations are scant (see Suddendorf, 1993, for a review).   
As yet, we have to assume that chimpanzees cannot represent others' false beliefs, i.e.  
they cannot represent knowledge that is in opposition to their own (Premack, 1988,  
Premack & Dasser, 1991; Whiten, 1992). 
 
 
Knowing Yourself and Knowing Others 
 
     If we assume that apes do have some ability to attribute mental states, may the  
deficits in mindreading capacity that are nonetheless apparent bear any constraining  
impact on their potential mental time travelling ability?  I will risk a speculation that  
an inability to represent mental states opposed to one's own present mental states  
applies not only to the mental states of others, but also to one's own earlier mental  
states.  This inference is empirically supported by recent findings in child psychology.  
     In human development two, three and four-year-olds progressively master the  
attribution of desires, then beliefs, and finally false beliefs (i.e. simultaneously  
representing knowledge that is contrary to their own) (see, for example, Gopnik, 1993;  
Wellman, 1991; Whiten, 1991; Wimmer & Perner, 1983).  Consistent with the above  
speculation, the acquisition of attributing opposing mental states to others coincides  
with, or follows, the acquisition of attributing opposing mental states to one's self in  
the past (Gopnik, 1993).  Three-year-olds fail to understand that their current  
knowledge, for example that there are pencils and not smarties in the candy box, may  
not be available to others and wrongly predict that another child believes pencils to be  
in the candy box (Perner, Leekam & Wimmer, 1987).  Asked what they themselves  
believed to be in the candy box before they were shown, they apparently fail to  
remember their own previous false belief and say that they originally thought pencils  
were in the box (Gopnik & Astington, 1988).  In contrast to changes in belief, changes  
in the physical world were remembered by the subjects.  Children younger than four  
years seem to have problems remembering information referring to an opposing past  
state of themselves as much as they fail to represent contrary mental states of others.   
This appears to be as true for desires as for the later understanding of intentions and  
beliefs.  Having eaten enough to satiate a desire, still one third of three-year-olds  
reported not having been hungry before:  after eating four portions of mousse the  
children insisted that they had not had a desire for the mousse before (Gopnik, 1993).   
Full understanding of opposing-to-own-present mental states of others or past self (of  
desires, intentions and beliefs) is not reached before the average age of three and a  
half to four years. 
     The inference, then, is that if chimpanzees cannot attribute mental states to others  
that oppose their own, then they should not be able to attribute past mental states to  
themselves that oppose their present ones.  We have seen that recent findings in  
developmental psychology, while not providing proof, do support this idea.  However,  
would this inability restrict chimpanzees' ability to mentally re-experience past  
episodes?  Does this inability restrict three-year olds' episodic memory? 
     While implicit memory (e.g. conditioning, priming) appears to be functional very  
early in infancy, most studies indicate that memory for past episodes develops  
between age three and four (see Pillemer & White, 1989 for a review).  Two and a  
half year olds may recall some fragments of remote past events, but only between the  
ages of three and four do children seem to begin to mentally travel into their past, i.e.  
to mentally reconstruct past episodes as organized narratives.  Around the same age  
(between three and four, Loftus, 1993; Pillemer & White, 1989; Sheingold & Tenny,  
1982) childhood amnesia begins to cease.  That is, adults' accessible memory for past  
episodes usually begins from that point9.    
     At around the same time children acquire gradually the abilities to mentally  
reconstruct past episodes and to attribute mental states to others and to themselves.   
This may not be mere coincidence.  Children who fail to recall their opposing-to- 
present past mental states may not have acquired a fully established episodic memory  
system because past episodes are defined by the past state of the world and the past  
state of self.  Although the children seem to some extent to be able to remember past  
states of the world, they are apparently unable to recall their own past mental states, or  
at least those aspects of their past mental states that are contradictory to the present  
one.  A full picture of a past episode, however, requires that one represents one's  
former states of mind (e.g. desires, intentions and beliefs) in order to understand and,  
more fundamentally, reconstruct the past interaction of self and the world.   
     That children have difficulties with the essential self-referencing aspect of episodic  
memory is further substantiated by the finding that three-year-olds have problems  
recalling the source of their own current knowledge (Gopnik & Graf, 1988; O'Neill &  
Gopnik, 1991).  Although it may have happened only minutes ago, they apparently  
fail to reconstruct the episode during which they have acquired their current  
knowledge.  A fully-fledged episodic memory system that allows for mental time  
travel back to (or, reconstruction of) the experience of self at a past point in time  
demands the ability to represent opposing-to-present mental states.  Only at the age of  
three and a half to four years does the child fully master this, and only then may it  
therefore establish an episodic memory system comparable to the adult human one.   
Later still, between four and eight years, the child acquires an explicit knowledge  
about the culturally dependent time patterns (e.g. weeks, months, years) that assist the  
structuring of one's own past experiences (Friedman, 1991, 1992). 
     If chimpanzees cannot represent opposing-to-present mental states of their past  
selves, one may conclude that chimpanzees cannot have a fully established episodic  
memory system.  While they may have an elementary memory for past events of the  
world comparable to that in children under three and a half years, the reconstruction of  
one's own past experiences requires the representation of opposing-to-present mental  
states.  Without such reconstruction mental time travel into one's own past is  
drastically limited.  
 
 
A Model for the Development of Mental Time Travel and Mindreading 
 
     Because of the hypothesized link between mindreading and mental time travel I  
will propose a model for mental time travel that is based on one of the explanatory  
concepts that have been put forward for the development of `theory of mind'.   
Simulation theory is a model proposed for children's mindreading development  
(Gordon, 1986; Harris, 1991; Humphrey, 1986; Johnson, 1988), and it may also serve  
as a conceptualization for mental time travel.  According to this model the child does  
not hold an actual `theory' of mind but acquires knowledge of another person's mind  
by internally simulating that person's situation (i.e. his or her self-world  
constellation)10.  This idea is based on evidence that two- to three-year-olds can  
imagine having a mental state (e.g. belief or desire) that they do not have and that they  
can imagine different worlds (Harris, 1991).  Both abilities appear to be evident in the  
development of children's pretend play.  During early childhood children improve  
their ability to reason from pretend premises (see Harris, 1991) which appears  
necessary for more advanced mindreading based on the analogy from imagined to  
real.  Harris (1991) postulates that imagined events are produced against a background  
of default settings which correspond to the current state of self and of the world.   
Between two and four years of age the child learns to become flexible and accurate in  
altering the default settings in order to imagine what it would be like being in  
somebody else's position.  The child has to change the default setting of the state of  
the world (as known to the child) to the state of the world as known to the other and  
the intentional stance of self to the intentional stance of the other in order to make a  
correct simulation of the self-world constellation of the other.  
     According to this approach, the typical failures of younger children result from an  
insufficient ability to set aside their own current knowledge of the state of the world  
and/or to detach from their own intentional stance (Goldman, 1993; Harris, 1993).   
Their own present states interfere with the simulation.  Escaping from the influence of  
one's own mental states is learned first in respect to intentional stance and then in  
respect to knowledge and belief.  By age four the child is able to accurately simulate  
the mind-world relationship of others.  Only later still, I suggest, may these simulation  
processes lead to the formation of an actual theory of mind, i.e. a semantic set of rules  
that describe the nature of mind and that allow for understanding and prediction of  
another's mind and action without requiring an internal simulation.  The ability of  
mental perspective taking and simulation is, however, not lost to adult humans.  While  
we can quickly infer that someone is jealous, based on our knowledge about the  
circumstances and our semantic theory of the nature of minds, we can also try to  
imagine what it would be like being in the other's position.  Such a simulated  
`episodic' process may result in better, more empathic understanding and better  
prediction of the other person's feelings, thoughts and actions.  
     The ontogeny (and perhaps phylogeny) of our access to our own past might be  
quite similar to the development of mindreading outlined above.  The mental  
reconstruction of past episodes may also be based on using one's imagination to  
represent other possible worlds and states of self.  A semantic concept (theory) of the  
past may develop only later in life.  Instead, children may first have to learn to  
mentally simulate (reconstruct) past episodes.  Instead of imagining what it would be  
like, one may simulate what it was like being in a specific situation.  The  
reconstruction of past episodes may be understood as an internal simulation of past  
states of the world and of the self.  This requires the basic capacity to attribute current  
representations to experiences of one's self at a past point in time, i.e. to recognize  
them as memories.  Both processes are fostered in human development by the  
guidance of parents who usually ask for and support the verbal report (reconstruction)  
of past episodes.  However, as for the mindreading capacity, children have to acquire  
the ability to accurately alter default settings, i.e. to set aside their current mental state  
(intentional stance to and knowledge about the world) when attempting to simulate  
past episodes11.  Only at about age four may they be able to mentally travel back in  
time and simulate (re-experience) their own past state and the state of the world as it  
was known to the past self.  Later still, this ability to re-experience (re-present) past  
episodes may result in an abstract understanding of the past which may allow for  
quick access to relevant information of past episodes without involving internal  
simulation and re-experiencing of the complex episode.  As with mindreading, the  
earlier system of simulation remains functional in later life.  We can remember that  
we have seen Paul this afternoon without simulating the past episode, and we can also  
travel mentally into the past, `picture' the situation, reminisce (re-experience) the  
encounter and empathize with our own or Paul's position.  Instead of proposing a  
sharp distinction between the systems it may be more reasonable to view them as two  
extremes of a continuum whereby the more abstract conscious access grew out of the  
ability to mentally simulate past episodes12. 
     Can other animals use mental simulation for the reconstruction of past episodes?   
Chimpanzees (and perhaps the other great apes) fulfil the mental simulation  
prerequisite of being able to imagine other possible worlds (Byrne & Whiten, 1992).   
In contrast to monkeys, chimpanzees seem to be self-aware and appear to engage in  
`true' pretence, i.e. they form second-order representations about the world (Whiten &  
Byrne, 1991).  Reasoning in this imagined world appears to be possible for  
chimpanzees and proper transference between real and imagined world also appears to  
occur.  In order to solve Koehler's (1917/1927) raking problem by insight the  
chimpanzee Sultan seemed to form a mental representation of the situation,  
manipulate components in his imagination until he hit upon a solution, and then enact  
the solution in the real world.  Chimpanzees seem to be able to attribute at least some  
mental states to others (Premack, 1988), to imitate (Meador et al., 1987) and to take  
other's roles (Povinelli, Nelson & Boysen, 1992), which may mean that they can use  
mental simulation processes.  Perhaps chimpanzees are only limited by the `small' but,  
according to the outlined model, significant step of escaping their present state of  
mind in order to fully travel mentally into their own past and reminisce the way we  
do.  I have argued above that chimpanzees' presumed inability to simultaneously  
represent opposing-to-own mental states of others may also indicate their inability to  
represent opposing-to-present mental states of their own past, and in this respect they  
may resemble three-year-old children13.  A completely functional episodic memory  
system may require the ability to detach from the present, to attribute representations  
to the past and to use the imagination to reconstruct them into episodes with a  
storyline for the interaction of both, states of the world and states of self.  Awareness  
of and access to the contents of the dimension of time may be strongly dependent on  
the full development of all mental abilities involved in such a system.  An overview of  
the model is provided by table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Proposed Development of Mindreading and Mental Time Travel into 
One's Own Past 
 
Mental stage 
 
Ontogeny 
 
Phylogeny 
 
2nd-order representation self-awareness 
imagine other possible worlds 
 
2 yearsa 
 
great apes    
gorilla? 
 
Attribution of 
mental states but 
interference of 
own present state 
in simulation 
 
reconstruction of 
past events but 
interference of 
own present state 
in simulation 
 
3 years 
 
great apes? 
 
attribution of 
mental states; 
simulation without 
interference 
 
time travel into 
past; simulation 
without 
interference 
 
4 years 
 
homo erectus?b 
 
abstract theory of 
mind 
 
abstract concept 
of past 
 
5 years   
onwards 
 
homo sapiens 
 
 
a age is not a causal agent but allows for roughly averaged categorization 
b see section `when did mental time travel emerge' below 
 
 
 
 
Why Travel Mentally into the Past? 
 
     What adaptive advantage could it have to represent one's former state of mind in  
the context of past events, i.e. to mentally travel back in time, if phylogenetic older  
forms of memory already allow for learning from a single event?  We humans seem to  
care for our memory of past events as we do for a personal treasure, as expressed by  
the phrase: no one can take away your memories.  These memories seem to be valued  
for their own sake.  We can tell stories about our past, which certainly has the  
adaptive advantage of transmitting knowledge to others who do not have to  
experience those events themselves in order to learn from them.  However, this  
advantage could only have evolved after the emergence of language and is of benefit  
mainly to the receiver.  It appears more reasonable to search for selective advantages  
in the individual actually doing these time travels.  In fact, we do not merely repeat  
past situations mentally, we also reflect on them, which constitutes a significant  
advantage in that it permits us to learn over and over again from a single experience  
and thereby to increase semantic knowledge.  One picture may contain information  
requiring thousands of words to describe, and similarly one episode may contain  
thousands of semantic facts that may only become accessible if one can repeatedly  
look at it, either in reality or in imagination.  
     It is clear that a superior semantic knowledge about the world (e.g. facts about the  
physical, chemical and biological reality) was necessary for our species to change the  
world in the way it has (e.g. through technology, agriculture, science etc.).  Some  
scholars have taken this as evidence for the idea that semantic memory must have  
evolved, whether in phylogeny or in ontogeny, after the evolution of episodic memory  
(e.g. Donald, 1991; Seamon, 1984).  However, other animals appear to possess  
semantic memory (see above, p.8), which supports Tulving's (1983, 1984, 1985)  
perspective that episodic memory must have evolved later.  Nevertheless this  
development of a memory for past events may have had the great adaptive advantage  
of boosting the older semantic memory system.  The ability to mentally travel back in  
time, to simulate past experiences, enables the individual to extract far more semantic  
knowledge then could have been extracted at the moment of the experience itself.   
Episodic memory potentiates the access to information utilizable for the generation of  
abstract theories.  Conversely, Kinsbourne and Wood (1975, cited in Kinsbourne,  
1989) showed that the absence of episodic memory slows down the acquisition of new  
knowledge.  Using one's imagination to reconstruct episodes of the past is an  
evolutionary catalyst that boosts the ability to acquire sophisticated semantic  
knowledge.  Causal chains can be analyzed by putting (reconstructing) an event in  
broader contexts, relationships and rules can be extracted and the same (simulation)  
system can be used to change aspects, permitting the individual to test alternatives  
without having to face real-life consequences14. 
     Although these abilities clearly increase the fitness of the organism, they may not  
have evolved for these reasons.  In recent years the idea that intelligence or even  
consciousness has emerged in order to deal with social problems has become popular  
(e.g. Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Humphrey, 1976, 1986; Jolly, 1966).  This hypothesis of  
so-called `Machiavellian intelligence' (Byrne & Whiten, 1988; de Waal, 1982)  
suggests that the need to become a good natural psychologist was the selective  
pressure that produced intelligence in primates.  Clearly, if one knows what is on the  
mind of another individual, one is better at predicting and manipulating behaviour, at  
cooperating and planning, and at imitating and teaching.  If the Machiavellian  
intelligence hypothesis is correct, then our `self intelligence', our knowledge of  
present and past self, might be an exaptation:  it may have emerged from the ability to  
understand others.  Humphrey (1986) argued along these lines when he claimed that  
the human desire to gather a variety of experiences emerged because it allows us to  
understand others in similar situations.  But searching for a functional or temporal  
order in the interdependent complexity of evolution is difficult.  A selective pressure  
that would favour social intelligence would have inevitably favoured self intelligence,  
but the reverse pattern may equally be true.  Social and self intelligence seem  
inextricably interwoven.  Chimpanzees that have been reared in social isolation seem  
not to be able to recognize themselves in a mirror (Gallup, McClure, Hill & Bundy,  
1971), but if one can recognize one's self in a mirror, every conspecific may, at least  
to a degree, appear to be a mirror image of one's self (Bischof, 1978).  The ability to  
understand others and one's (past) self probably co-evolved. But whether or not one  
ability emerged merely as a by-product of the other remains debatable.  
     Regardless of whether the origins of mental time travel into one's own past are  
adaptational or exaptational, once evolved, it provided the basis for a definition of  
one's personal identity.  The imagination can be used to re-present and re-analyze the  
past and based on (or extrapolated from) this past it may also be used to pre-present  
change, was necessary for the evolution of a consciousness like ours (Ingvar, 1985;  
Popper & Eccles, 1977), and has had a possibly metamorphotic impact on many and  
varied aspects of life.   
     But another important ability is deeply involved in this evolutionary process.  It is  
the most sophisticated tool humans have developed for reading the minds of others  
and expressing one's own: language.  It is difficult to disentangle the evolutionary  
sequence of reading the minds of others, mental time travel and language.  All appear  
to be interdependent.  In ontogeny, early language training seems to precede the  
emergence of the other abilities and may indeed facilitate internal meta-representation  
and enhance narrative reconstruction of past episodes.  However, there is a reason  
why language probably emerged late in the phylogenetic sequence.  The crucial aspect  
of human language is its infinite flexibility (e.g. Corballis, 1991). In order to think or  
talk with infinite flexibility humans must have something of infinite flexibility to  
think or talk about.  The ability to mentally travel in time may have provided just that,  
creating mental access to the virtually unlimited content of the fourth dimension and  
therefore an open-endedness of thought that required an open-endedness of language  
for adequate expression.      
 
 
Summary 
 
     The question whether or not animals can mentally travel back into their own past  
cannot be answered directly, because in the absence of introspection or language we  
can infer only from observable behaviour what underlying mental mechanism may be  
involved.  Animals can learn from single events, but this is not sufficient evidence for  
the existence of the ability to conjure up episodes of the past.  Animals may have  
limited access to their past, not because they lack the necessary capacity to store  
information, but because of insufficient cognitive abilities.   
     Remembering past episodes seems to involve active reconstructive processes.   
Memory representations appear not to be `marked' as memories; instead, their role  
needs to be inferred.  Mental time travel into one's own past appears to require meta- 
representations and access to the content of one's own mind.  Currently available data  
suggest that only the great apes have such mental capacities.  The same picture  
emerges when one considers the interdependency between episodic memory and self- 
awareness:  only the great apes (with the possible exception of gorillas) seem to be  
able to recognize themselves in a mirror.  Monkeys fall short on both accounts,  
leaving the great apes as the most likely, if not only, candidates for potentially being  
able to mentally travel in time the way we do.  
     Nevertheless, even the great apes may suffer cognitive limitations, especially with  
respect to `theory of mind', that may prevent mental time travel.  "There is very little  
evidence that chimpanzees recognize a discrepancy between their own states of mind  
and the states of mind of others", write Cheney and Seyfarth (1990, p. 254).   
Chimpanzees' failure to solve tasks that demand the simultaneous representation of  
opposing-to-present states of mind (of knowledge and belief) may indicate that they  
are unable to represent their own past states of mind if those are opposed to their  
present ones.  This also appears to be the case for children under the age of four.  Only  
after this is overcome, may it be fully possible to travel mentally into one's own past.  
     Drawing from simulation theory of mindreading (e.g. Harris, 1991), I suggested  
that mental time travel might be understood as a reconstruction of memory traces into  
episodes that takes place in the imagination of the individual.  An ability to set aside  
the current state of mind would be necessary for the simulation of past episodes.   
While chimpanzees seem to fulfil most cognitive prerequisites for mental simulation,  
they may not be able to escape the influence of the present mental state, which may  
hinder the establishment of a fully fledged episodic memory system.  Further research  
may prove this wrong, but if not, and if Koehler (1917/1927) is right in his opinion  
that even chimpanzees' access to time is limited, then we might infer that mental time  
travel emerged after the phylogenetic split from apes, and was a critical factor in  
human evolution.  
 
 
 
 
 Mental Time Travel into the Future 
 
     In Greek mythology it was Prometheus who stole fire from heaven for the use of  
humans.  "The name Prometheus literally means foresight, the ability to look ahead  
and in imagination to experience events that lie in the future" (Coan, 1987, p.44).  So,  
according to the ancient Greeks, it was foresight that gave us some of the powers of  
the gods: the ability to see, to create, to control; the power that make us stand between  
the worlds of the animals and those of the gods.  Does this ancient wisdom bear a  
grain of truth for the processes that determined the course of human evolution?  
     Among the adaptative advantages of developing the ability to travel mentally into  
the past I briefly mentioned that this ability also provides the basis for the ability to  
look into the future.  This might have been a crucial consequence indeed.  Predicting  
the future is a fundamental human capacity that needs to be considered by any theory  
attempting to illuminate the reasons for the distinct impact our species has had on  
planet Earth.   
     The most crucial questions we can ask, according to Humphrey, are: 
      
 "Where have we come from? What are we? Where are we going? ... They are  
not really separate questions, but one big question taken in three bites.  For only by  
understanding where we have come from can we make sense of what we are; only by  
understanding what we are can we make sense of where we are going" [Humphrey,  
1986, p. 174]. 
 
The dependency of an understanding of future on an understanding of past and present  
is obvious:  unlike the past and present, the future is a pure figment of our  
imagination.  Mental states of past self and present others are attributed on the basis of  
actual stimuli (memory traces and perceptions), but attribution of future mental states  
is not a reaction to stimuli from the future, but is extrapolated from past and present.   
The same applies to representations of the world.  The future has to be voluntarily  
imagined.  Animals who lack the ability to reconstruct past episodes may also lack the  
ability to simulate future ones.  
     The level of understanding past and present determines the possible level of  
understanding the future.  Non-conscious effects of the past, as produced by classical  
conditioning, can result in same-level anticipations of future (e.g. Pavlov's dogs  
salivated before meat powder was present).  Conscious awareness of past episodes,  
however, can result in an awareness of potential future episodes.  Mental time travel  
into the future may be achieved through extrapolation from similar past episodes  
(prediction by analogy) or, more important for the understanding of humans'  
extraordinary impact on the world over the last 10,000 years, through the application  
of semantic knowledge (prediction by theory) about the laws that govern nature.  As  
with the development of mindreading and mental time travel into the past, the more  
abstract theory-based predictions may derive from the more basic ability to mentally  
simulate future episodes.   
`Instinctual' versus `Intelligent' Anticipatory Behaviour 
 
     It is highly adaptive for an organism to be able to act not only in order to ensure  
present survival, but also in order to increase future survival chances.  Anticipations  
have an apparent value for survival:  if one knows what will happen one can act now  
in order to prevent harm or maximize profit.  Anticipatory behaviour, however, can  
result from underlying mechanisms other than mental time travel (see also Appendix  
A).  Learning (e.g. operant conditioning) is inherently prospective, but the future need  
not to be mentally represented by the individual.  Similarly, insight-free instincts, such  
as hibernation, are another way organisms adapt a priori to recurring environmental  
changes (e.g. seasons) without the necessity for individual representation of future  
situations.  Hibernators prepare for the winter even if they have not experienced that  
season before.  The relatively inflexible anticipatory behaviour and its occurrence in  
only narrow contexts appears to distinguish what is labelled instinctual from what is  
labelled intelligent.  
     However, this dichotomy may be another qualitative distinction that may be  
viewed as a metamorphosis deriving from mere gradual differences.  Recently, Gibson  
(1990) has argued that intelligence and instinct may be viewed as the two ends of one  
continuum of `mental constructional ability'.  Based on connectionist models of the  
interconnectivity to the degree of hierachicalization of behaviour and therefore to the  
degree of flexibility that determines how instinctual or intelligent behaviour appears  
to be.  In this perspective, the relatively inflexible and context-specific anticipatory  
behaviours of relatively small-brained hibernators are at the one end of the continuum  
of mental constructional ability, while the flexible, context-independent mental time  
travels of adult humans represent the other end.  The constructional capacity to  
mentally simulate, or `picture', future events seems not to be required for anticipatory  
behaviour such as the hoarding of nuts by squirrels.  Even the apparently foresightful  
behaviour of satiated leopards wedging half-eaten carcases in a tree does not require  
the representation of future hunger and feast, because it is a typical behaviour for  
members of that species and evolved as an adaptive behaviour for specific  
circumstances (F. Reynolds, personal communication, June 19, 1993).  
     Cheney and Seyfarth (1990) refer to a kind of "laser beam" intelligence that  
animals often display in a single domain but not in others.  This inability to apply the  
knowledge possessed in one domain to contextually different problems might be due  
to an inaccessibility of the knowledge.  It may be the awareness about knowledge,  
knowing that and what one knows - or in short, metacognition - that allows us to  
apply our knowledge to different domains in a flexible and generative manner (cf.  
Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990).  
     The ability to form meta-representations of one's own knowledge might be a  
development at one end of Gibson's `mental constructional ability' continuum, like a  
metamorphosis, resulting in flexible behaviour of a qualitatively new kind.  As  
mentioned earlier, evidence for some form of such second-order representations is as  
yet available only for the great apes (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990; Suddendorf, 1993;  
Whiten & Byrne, 1991).  Mental time travel, however, whether into the past or into  
the future, requires this ability.  
     The use of one's imagination to mentally simulate future situations may require the  
same, and perhaps even more, cognitive abilities as mental simulation of one's past.   
In contrast to monkeys, great apes have provided evidence for the advanced cognitive  
features of second-order representation, imagination of other possible worlds, self- 
awareness and mindreading (which all appear interlinked).  Great apes may therefore  
have the basic cognitive capacities required for mental simulation.  Instead of  
imagining what it was like (as in simulation of past episodes) or what it would be like  
(as in mindreading) the simulation process may also be used to answer what it will be  
like being in a future situation.  As for the other two applications of the mental  
simulator, it appears necessary for the individual to detach from the current mental  
state in order to imagine other states (of others, past self or future self) that may be  
opposed to the present one.  Mental simulation of the future may be restricted in  
chimpanzees by their seeming inability to represent opposing-to-present future mental  
states and, additionally, by their limited access to past experiences which may limit  
the ability to infer future states of the world and self. 
     Despite these potential limitations, great apes' advanced cognitive abilities should  
allow for flexible problem solving with an eye to the future.  In fact, Doehl (1970)  
showed that the chimpanzee Julia was able to look several steps ahead in a sequential  
problem-solving task.  Julia had to choose between two keys in a transparent box  
which opened further boxes with keys until arriving at the final box containing either  
a food reward or nothing.  Only by choosing the right key in the beginning was reward  
obtainable.  Julia learned to act not by chance but by determining the route leading to  
the reward before choosing the initial key.  Each trial was of course a different  
arrangement of keys and boxes so that simple chaining explanations can be ruled out.   
Julia was able to look five steps ahead in pursuit of her final goal.  
     The different tool cultures of chimpanzees provide further examples of  
`forethought'.  The chimpanzees at Gombe, for example, manufacture tools at one  
place to use them later for termite fishing at another place out of sight (Goodall,  
1986).  In that a branch is trimmed for use as a probe, such behaviour may be based  
on the high `mental constructional ability' of second-order representation.  Whiten and  
Byrne (1991) argue that besides the primary perception of the branch as a branch, the  
individual has to generate a meta-representation of it as a probe.  Similarly to these  
observations in the field, the experimental observation of Sultan's problem solving by  
insight (Koehler, 1917/1927; see above, p.28) seems to indicate that chimpanzees can  
use their imagination to mentally construct (`picture') possible future realities. 
 
 
 
Anticipating Near versus Remote Futures 
  
     Despite this evidence for chimpanzees' capacity to imagine the future, Koehler  
(1917/1927) argued that it was restricted.  He suggested that it is "of theoretical  
importance that the clearest consideration of a future event occurs when the  
anticipated event is a planned act of the animal itself" (Koehler, 1917/1927, p. 272).   
The reason for this has to do with the motivational connection between the animal at  
present and the anticipated event.  Clearly, Sultan imagined `the future' as an attempt  
to get the bananas that could satisfy his present hunger.  Similarly, Julia's performance  
was driven by her desire for the food reward and the Gombe chimpanzees'  
manufacture of sticks is motivated by an appetite for termites.  However complex  
these anticipations are, they are concerned with a relatively near future.  Koehler  
viewed this as the `dynamic essence of drive behaviour' and as belonging to the  
present; the anticipations do not go beyond the actual context of one behavioural unit  
or gestalt.  In other words, one could say that animals appear to be bound to the  
present.  This notion is expressed in many writings about the restrictedness of animal  
thought compared with that of humans.  Recently, Donald wrote for example that  
apes' "behavior, complex as it is, seems unreflective, concrete and situation bound"  
(Donald, 1991, p. 199).  And Stebbins (1982) and Eccles (1989) refer to `time- 
binding', i.e. simultaneous access to past and future, as a unique human feature.   
Bischof (1978, 1985) and Bischof-Koehler (1985) make this point more explicit and,  
based on Koehler's (1917/1927) writings, suggest a limit to the extent to which  
animals can represent the future.  They claim that animals cannot anticipate future  
needs or drive states and are therefore bound to a present that is defined by their  
current motivational state.  Only humans, they argue, have acquired the ability to  
imagine a remote future that lies beyond the current needs.  I will call this idea the  
Bischof-Koehler hypothesis (this name refers to all three researchers involved:  
Wolfgang Koehler (1917/1927), Norbert Bischof (1978; 1985) and Doris Bischof- 
Koehler (1985)). 
     None of these authors provided a clear definition of drive or need, whether  
anticipated or current.  They seem to rely on a common sense understanding of the  
terms.  A review of the long debate about motivation, drives and needs goes beyond  
the scope of this paper.  However, Bischof (1985) illustrates his point with the  
example of the homeostatic motive, thirst.  When an animal is thirsty it tries to find a  
way to get something to drink:  perception is focused on key stimuli that indicate  
access to water (e.g. certain plants that grow only close to lakes and rivers), memory  
is searched, and so on.  To begin these procedures animals must first experience the  
thirst; humans need not.  While a full-bellied lion is no threat to nearby zebras, a full- 
bellied human may well be.  Clearly, humans anticipate future needs very often as  
expressed in that we collect (buy) food even if we are not hungry or in that we carry  
(possess) tools, even if we do not need them to satisfy any current needs, because we  
can anticipate their usefulness for the satisfaction of future needs.   Business, for  
instance, is to a great extent dependent on anticipations of one's own and others' future  
needs. 
     The Bischof-Koehler hypothesis appears to be consistent with the idea, outlined  
above, that animals may be unable to escape the influence of the present mental state.   
While chimpanzees fulfil most of the cognitive requirements necessary to use the  
setting aside their own current mental state in order to imagine opposing-to-present  
future (past) mental states.  The emphasis that the Bischof-Koehler hypothesis places  
on the representation of future needs is justifiable.  What adaptive advantage would  
there be in developing the capacity to imagine remote futures, if this forethought is  
conferred to serve only the present needs?  If all one cares about is related to the  
current needs because one cannot imagine future ones (or cannot set aside the present  
one), what aid does one receive from imaginations of remote futures?  Only if one can  
realize that one will have different future needs does it appear to make sense to invest  
in further capacities to represent aspects of remote futures.  While many animals may  
have concurrent drives and needs with varying degrees of urgency, anticipating future  
needs appears to be special. This ability seems crucial for the evolution of `unlimited'  
mental time travel.    
     However, chimpanzees appear to have problems with representing opposing-to- 
own mental states of knowledge and belief, but not necessarily with the attribution of  
contrary desires and intentions.  Chimpanzees can attribute desires and intentions to  
others (Woodruff & Premack, 1978), but it is not clear if they can do so when these  
states actually oppose their own current state.  In order to demonstrate this, one might  
seek evidence that completely satiated chimpanzees, for example, can attribute hunger  
to others (but see also the experiment suggested in Appendix B).  If chimpanzees can  
attribute opposing-to-present states of needs to others, then problems with setting  
aside the current state of needs could hardly account for the postulated inability to  
represent own future needs.  Rather than being caused by an inability to  
simultaneously represent opposing (future) needs, chimpanzees' limited access to a  
remote future may be due to their limited access to their past.  In order to mentally  
infer future states of the world and self, one has to extrapolate from one's knowledge  
of the past.  The voluntary imagination of future needs evoked by an imagined remote  
future environment may demand more access to the past (e.g what environmental  
circumstances produce(d) what needs) than chimpanzees possess.  
 
 
Can Apes Travel Mentally into Remote Futures?  
Reviewing the Evidence 
 
     Although Griffin (1978) pointed 15 years ago to the importance of acquiring  
knowledge about animals' sense of a remote future and urged cognitive ethologists to  
specifically study this realm, as yet little has been published on the topic.  The few  
experimental investigations of animal forethought are generally concerned with the  
ability to anticipate near futures (e.g. Washburn & Rumbaugh, 1992).  As yet we need  
to rely on anecdotal data in order to assess the validity of the Bischof-Koehler  
hypothesis. 
     When Jane Goodall (1986) asked to what extent chimpanzees can plan ahead, she  
chose an example of a male chimpanzee called Satan:  "[w]hen Satan followed a  
female in estrus until she nested, then slept close beside her, was he planning the early  
morning getaway? Or did he simply take advantage, each time, of the favorable  
circumstances he found himself in the morning?" (Goodall, 1986, p.588).  No matter  
what the answer, it seems to be apparent that Satan, even if he had planned the  
situation, was acting according to his present sexual drive.  The anecdote would  
therefore constitute a single, although extended, entity of `dynamic drive behaviour';  
that is, it would still not extend into the `future' in Koehler's sense.   
     Bischof (1985) points to a general evolutionary pattern progressively increasing the  
gap between drive and action.  Great apes display quite extensive gaps.  They are able  
to postpone the immediate enactment of their current drive, producing the intention to  
receive gratification at a future point in time.  De Waal (1982), for example, reported  
an instance that took place in the Arnhem Zoo.  The researchers hid grapefruits in the  
chimpanzee enclosure by burying them in sand.  Once outside, the chimpanzees  
searched enthusiastically but unsuccessfully for the hidden treat, although several,  
including Dandy, passed over the spot.  Only later in the afternoon did it become  
apparent that not all chimpanzees had failed to find the spot.  Unnoticed by the others,  
Dandy went straight to the hiding place, dug up the fruits and enjoyed the treat having  
avoided competition.  Other examples of this kind can be found in Byrne and Whiten's  
(1990) database of tactical deception in primates.  However, while postponing the  
enactment of a current drive may be a necessary prerequisite and a step towards  
future-need anticipation and consideration, it is not equivalent. 
     Chimpanzees have been observed carrying stones over long distances to open nuts  
at a place where no suitable `stone tools' can be found (Boesch & Boesch, 1984).   
However, even this extreme instance of apparent forethought seems to be induced by  
the current drive.  "What is imagined is the resonance of current needs in a future  
environment" (translated from Bischof, 1985, p. 541).  The chimpanzees that pick up  
the stones and carry them seem to do this to satisfy the already present motive of  
having an appetite for these special nuts.  Thus, it could be argued that the future  
environment can be anticipated, but only with the inducement of the current drive,  
which remains unchanged and outlines the instance as one behavioural unit. 
     As yet, only one reported anecdote appears to suggest that chimpanzees may  
anticipate future needs: 
   
 It is November and the days are becoming colder. On this particular morning  
Franje collects all the straw from her cage (subgoal) and takes it with her under her  
arm so that she can make a nice warm nest for herself outside (goal). Franje does not  
do this in reaction to the cold, but before she can have actually felt how cold it is  
outside. [de Waal, 1982, p.192] 
 
Apparently, the chimpanzee Franje anticipated the future coldness and the resulting  
future desire or need for warmth.  But since the above citation is the entire  
information published about this case, many question marks remain.  As with many  
other anecdotes, alternative, more parsimonious, explanations cannot be ruled out and  
are indeed plausible.  Experimental research is needed (in Appendix B I propose a  
possible experimental paradigm).  A single anecdote, in contrast to a single proven  
case, cannot falsify the Bischof-Koehler hypothesis, i.e. that animals are present or  
situation-bound because they cannot anticipate own future needs.  
     However, absence of evidence for future-need anticipations in animals is not  
equivalent to evidence for absence.  The Bischof-Koehler hypothesis appears to be  
congruent with our current knowledge about animals (see Appendix A for the results  
of a survey of animal foresight).  But the Zeitgeist of science in the first 70 years of  
this century did not allow much anecdotal evidence for animal intelligence (such as  
forethought) to surface and experimental studies did not focus on `mentalist' concepts.   
While the widespread and relatively uncritical use of anecdotes led 19th-century  
scientists to radically overestimate the mentality of animals (Lindsay, 1880, for  
example, concluded that animals engage in criminal activities and commit suicide,  
cited in Bernstein, 1988), most 20th-century scientists appear to have made the  
systematic bias of underestimating animals' cognitive capacities.  `Lloyd Morgan's  
canon' destroyed the acceptability of the anecdotal method and the emergence of `the  
principle of parsimony' demanded that one should attribute the behaviour of an animal  
to no higher, or more complex, level of mental ability than is strictly necessary.  It  
remains debatable, however, whether our decision about what constitutes higher and  
what constitutes lower is correct (cf. Griffin, 1981; Suddendorf, 1993).  To find data  
that could potentially falsify the Bischof-Koehler hypothesis among the database  
deriving from this period appears unlikely even on a priori grounds.  However, the  
research climate is changing.  Speculations about the evolution of mental abilities in  
recent studies (e.g. Cheney and Seyfarth's study on vervet monkeys) seem to place  
more emphasis on what level of mental ability is optimal rather than what level is  
minimal (Figueredo, 1992).  And the anecdotal method has been successfully  
reintroduced for studying primate deception (Whiten & Byrne, 1988; Byrne &  
Whiten, 1990, 1992), a phenomenon completely ignored under the earlier paradigm.   
Instead of naive overestimation of animal mentality without experimental evidence  
and instead of underestimation of animal mentality by depriving us of valuable  
anecdotes (the phenomenon of infanticide, despite its social and evolutionary  
importance, was unrecognized until anecdotes were `accepted'), we now seem to be  
entering a phase of more balanced inquiry.  Experimental studies have shown many  
advanced mental abilities to exist in animals (see above, p.2, 3, 15-19) and systematic  
gathering of anecdotal observations enriches the realms of further inquiry (see  
Appendix A).  
     Before discussing the adaptive advantages of mental time travel into the future yet  
another type of apparent forethought needs to be mentioned.   
 
 
 It often happens that human beings discover the goals of their behaviour only  
in retrospect.  During adolescence, for example, we stand up against our parents,  
provoking and challenging them.  Later we may explain this behaviour by saying, `I  
wanted my independence', but remember that we did not start the generation conflict  
with this motive explicitly in mind.  It was an unnamed, unconscious motive.  [de  
Waal, 1982, p.193]  
 
De Waal put forward this example as a possible explanation for the strategic  
intelligence displayed by the ex-alpha male Yeroen of the Arnhem chimpanzee  
colony.  After losing his alpha position to Luit, Yeroen cooperated with the third male  
Nikkie which eventually brought Yeroen, as Nikkie's right hand, back to power.  This  
success occurred months later after being initially negative.  Not all behaviour that  
turns out to be smart in retrospect was necessarily intended with the future goal in  
mind. 
     Similar explanations could account for apparently forethoughtful behaviour such as  
the acquisition of mental maps for future use.  Gorillas and chimpanzees seem to  
acquire an extensive knowledge about their territory, permitting the individual to take  
the shortest route to desired fruiting trees or, in the case of chimpanzees of the Tai  
forest, to stones for opening nuts (C.E.G. Tutin, personal communication, June 25,  
1993; Boesch & Boesch, 1984).  Whether this knowledge is acquired with intention,  
that is, having in mind the usefulness of this knowledge for the future, is questionable,  
however.  Many animals learn more than would be actually necessary for current  
demands.  Learning as such is inextricably interwoven with control and  
anticipation15.  Information is stored for future use.  Indeed, animals may store  
information for future use only; not for the reconstruction of the past (see above, p.7- 
36).  It is a well known fact that rats, for example, learn where food is hidden in a  
maze even if they are not hungry.  Being hungry a day later, they go straight to the  
food when being put into the maze.  This so-called latent learning requires that the rats  
have acquired a mental map for potential future use.  There is no reason, however, to  
assume that the rats have mentally travelled into the future, anticipated the potential  
future hunger and decided that it is worth remembering where the food was placed.   
Neither is there evidence that the mental maps acquired by apes require such  
forethoughtful mental processes.  In spite of their advanced mental capacities,  
chimpanzees have as yet not provided evidence for awareness about remote futures  
(cf. Appendix A). 
     It may therefore be conjectured that only humans can mentally travel in time in a  
virtually unlimited way.   
 
 
 
 
 
Why Travel Mentally into the Future? 
 
     As outlined in the previous sections, organisms evolved a variety of means to  
enable them to act in ways that increase future fitness.  Mostly innate, species- and  
domain-specific, anticipatory behaviour and basically all forms of memory and  
learning are of this kind.  While all great apes may have developed the mental  
constructional ability to meta-represent their own knowledge, i.e. to know what they  
know, only humans may have discovered a new dimension of knowledge (time) that  
they are aware of.  What adaptive advantage could it have to evolve mental time travel  
into the future additionally to the phylogenetic older forms of `considering' the future?   
In the following I will only touch on some of the crucial consequences.  Outstanding  
among those potential advantages is the individual flexibility of anticipations and the  
consequential increased degree of flexibility and generativity of behaviour.    
     In contrast to phylogenetic earlier mechanisms, mental representation of possible  
futures allows for anticipation of virtually anything and for flexible adaptation of  
current behaviour in consideration of this future.  The fitness of this new mechanism  
depends mainly on the accuracy of relevant mental predictions.  Mental simulation of  
likely futures can be achieved by extrapolating similar past episodes, by generating  
and applying heuristics and, at perhaps the most sophisticated and recent level, by  
induction or deduction of actual theories about the world (including the mind).  In  
short, it depends on one's access to the past and the knowledge one has been able to  
extract about the `laws' of nature, such as causal relations.  The immediate fitness  
value of mental time travels into the future is the increased degree of flexibility in the  
ability to act now for the future.  Once on this phylogenetic track, strong selective  
pressure favours better anticipation of the future, i.e. better acquisition of experience  
and knowledge and its utilization for prediction, and better manipulation of the future  
(see below).   
     In this process, behaviour became more and more dependent on what is mentally  
represented.  Apes may to some degree read the minds of others in order to predict  
and manipulate behaviour, but for humans, with their mental access to time, this  
becomes essential.  Although the behaviourists tried, human behaviour can often not  
be understood or predicted without considering what is on the individual's mind.  In  
particular, one has to take into account that human behaviour can be driven by  
intentions that derive from mentally represented goals that lie in the remote future,  
well beyond the satisfaction of the current needs.  Understanding and prediction of  
human behaviour is further hampered by the obscure complexity of the not-directly- 
observable mental world of social interaction.  A far more sophisticated  
`Machiavellian intelligence' emerged to deal with these problems:  a narrative mind  
able to understand and predict the world in an event-filled rather than abstract time  
(cf. Carrithers, 1991). First of all, however, new mechanisms of motivation must have  
emerged with mental time travel. 
     Classic theories of motivation, generalized to animals and humans, emphasized  
innate forces and learned stimulus-dependent factors.  With mental time travel into  
remote futures humans acquired a quite different set of influential factors.  The  
anticipation of future needs, as pointed out above, might have been a milestone in  
evolution.  Simulating future environment-need constellations (e.g. a dry area will  
evoke thirst) can affect current motivation and behaviour (e.g. one may decide to carry  
water when walking into a particular area) even when this is contradictory to the  
present environment-need constellation (e.g. plenty of water and no thirst) (cf.  
Bischof, 1985).  With mental time travel into the future a third component of  
motivation needs to be considered because imagined future needs can be converted  
into current motivators.  Long-term goals can be generated and current behaviour can  
be adjusted to serve these aims. 
     To make these processes functional within the cognitive apparatus, I postulate the  
emergence of a cognitive motive organizer, or CMO, which fulfils two  
phylogenetically new tasks:  (1) to represent most likely and significant anticipations  
and/or remember relevant earlier anticipations (cf. `memory of the future', Ingvar,  
1985) and (2) to evaluate and coordinate these anticipations and the current  
environment-need constellation.  New and differentially weighted motives can be  
generated and complexly organized.  In recent years motivation theorists have come to  
appreciate the importance of humans' concern about the future.  Bandura (1991)  
summarized those studies and theories of motivation that include cognitive motivators  
(expectancy-value, goal and attribution theory).  He concluded that "[c]ognitive  
regulation of motivation relies extensively on an anticipatory proactive system rather  
than simply on a reactive negative feedback system" (Bandura, 1991, p.150).  Earlier  
he pointed out that "even in the so-called biological motivators, human behavior is  
extensively activated and regulated by anticipatory and generative cognitive  
mechanisms rather than simply impelled by biological urges" (Bandura, 1991, p.70).  
     This proactive anticipatory system, or CMO, demands an executive and decision- 
making authority.  This may be the origins of what we believe to be our `freedom of  
will'.  Our intentions, motives and goals appear, at least to a degree, to be up to us.   
Animal behaviour is driven by innate, learned or homoeostatic factors which may not  
be under the voluntary control of the individual because the organism cannot represent  
alternative future drives.  In contrast, the CMO allows humans to alter and even create  
new motives based on access to the future.  Individuals became responsible for their  
own drive management16.  An intrinsic by-product of this new element of choice is  
that one may be `wrong' in one's decisions.  This, of course, is the fundamental basis  
of morality.  Instead of being driven, humans can put themselves in the driver's seat,  
having to take responsibility for their own intentions and actions.  Nature let one of its  
creatures off the leash, as it were. 
     However, perceived control, whether the control is real or not, is a dimension of  
reinforcement for humans and animals.  But mental time travel results in a new kind  
of potential control over one's own destiny.  This refers not only to one's intentions  
and goals but also to one's influence upon the future.  Humans must have inevitably  
learned that their future anticipations are based on guesses and inferences, not on  
clairvoyance.  On the one hand, better predictions may be achieved through greater  
knowledge, but on the other hand they may also be achieved through greater control  
of the future.  Attempting to direct the future through proactive manipulation appears  
to be a natural consequence of an awareness about possible futures.  The perceived  
control may be achieved through `religious' or `natural' technologies (see Festinger,  
1983)17.  The required generativity and flexibility, perhaps underlying both  
technology and language (Corballis, 1991; Greenfield, 1991), could only have been  
achieved through mental access to the infinite content of the dimension of time.   
     All these processes that I have touched on are, of course, far more complex than  
could thoroughly be discussed in this paper and involve many factors that are  
multidimensionally interconnected (see also Bischof, 1985; Suddendorf, 1992).   
However, it should have become clear that our awareness of time is deeply involved  
in many crucial human developments.  The scientific neglect of this important human  
capacity needs to be overcome if we ever want to understand our nature, our evolution  
and our development.  A final important consequence remains to be discussed, which  
will clearly illustrate the importance of our awareness of time for ourselves.  
     As Humphrey (1986) pointed out, the crucial questions of where we come from,  
what we are and where we are going are essentially one.  Only with an awareness  
about time can we ask these questions and perhaps find answers, through which we  
can define our personal identity.  In addition to the self-awareness displayed at present  
in other great apes, humans can form a concept of self over time.  Although  
fundamental psychological and physical changes take place in our individual  
development from infancy to old age our capacity for mental time travel allows us to  
view any of these stages as part of our personal identity.  Furthermore, this self  
experiences a certain control over its own drive management, by being the authority  
that is making decisions about goals and, if necessary, even about overriding the basic  
instincts (e.g. hunger in strike or fasting) in pursuit of these goals.  Our impression of  
`freedom of will' and our personal identity over time are consequences of mental time  
travel that have profoundly affected the human ego. 
      Mental time travel into an unrestrictedly remote future must have confronted  
humans with what according to Freud is the most frightening of all conceivable facts:  
one's inevitable death.  The perception of continuity of one's personal identity over  
time might have resulted in the belief in a continuing identity after death:  a  
continuing `soul', whether in heaven or hell, in this world or another, in the same body  
or in a different one.  This belief may be applied, not only to those who can form such  
mental concepts (i.e. humans; discontinuity philosophy), but also to those who cannot  
(i.e. all living beings; continuity philosophy).  To deal with the insecurity and lack of  
control about one's destiny after death, socially shared after-life concepts may have  
emerged:  the core of religions.  Goals and needs that lie beyond one's own lifetime  
were anticipated.  The ancient Egyptians or Chinese, for example, believed in the  
after-life need for goods while people who believe in heaven and hell may anticipate  
the need to have a `clean slate'.  Current life became strongly affected by the answers  
to the inevitable questions mental time travel provoked.  I agree with Gould (1991)  
that a single exaptive argument for the origin of religions cannot explain all  
multifaced and complex aspects of the evolution of these institutions, but the  
emergence of the ability to become aware about time and one's personal future surely  
played a fundamental role.  
     When human's mental horizon broadened by the dimension of time, the course of  
human evolution changed significantly.  Changes in behaviour, cognition, motivation  
and emotion must have taken place, justifying the simplifying label `prime mover'. 
 
 
When did Mental Time Travel Emerge? 
 
     In order to investigate the history of a living organism or of some of its  
characteristics, one can use information about currently living species and about  
remains and artifacts from the past.  Recent advances in genetics have changed our  
concept about the relationship of today's species.  In particular for many it was   
surprising that, in spite of the apparent differences, humans and chimpanzees (Pan  
troglodytes) seem to be genetically more closely related than chimpanzees and gorillas  
(Gorilla gorilla) (Miyamoto, Slightom & Goodman, 1987; Gibbons, 1990)18. 
     The common ancestors of humans and chimpanzees lived about 5 to 8 million  
years ago.  Since the human-ape branch grew out of the primate tree some 30 million  
years ago, humans share about 22-25 million years of evolution with chimpanzees that  
humans and chimps do not share with monkeys.  It should therefore not surprise that  
in many respects chimpanzees differ more from monkeys than they differ from us.   
However, the reviewed evidence suggests that chimpanzees do not share the  
apparently important human capacity of unrestricted mental time travel and one may  
therefore conjecture that this characteristic developed after the phylogenetic split from  
chimpanzees19.  What evidence do we have about the emergence of mental time  
travel in the last 5 to 8 million years of evolution? 
     The archaeological record provides us only with limited and selected information  
about human evolution.  Important cognitive developments, such as mental time  
travel, often do not manifest in physical evidence.  We are therefore likely to commit  
type II errors in our archaeological analysis; that is, we are likely to accept the null  
hypothesis that our forebears did not possess some cognitive ability when in fact they  
did.  Conversely, the likelihood of committing type I errors, i.e. to reject the null  
hypothesis and accept the hypothesis that some cognitive ability was present, even  
though it was not, is reduced.  However, type I errors are also likely because of  
possible misinterpretations of the few data that we have.  With these considerations in  
mind, let us now consider the evidence for mental time travel in our ancestors. 
     Stone tools - perhaps merely due to their durability - are the oldest known artifacts  
and have often been viewed as the earliest evidence for real humans (this is why  
Leakey labelled the 1.8-million-year-old body remains `Homo habilis' or `handy man'  
in contrast to the australopithecines).  However, the oldest stone tools, the so-called  
Oldowan tools (datings vary from 2.4 to 1.6 million years old), associated with Homo  
habilis20, seem to be within the competence of modern chimpanzees (Wynn &  
McGrew, 1989; see also Toth et al., 1993) and the stone tool culture of tai  
chimpanzees (e.g. Boesch & Boesch, 1984), although not involving manufacture of  
stone tools, has been evaluated as representing a similar state of development (Wynn  
& McGrew, 1989).  The production of an Oldowan tool may require some mental  
picture of the finished product and the use to which it will be put, but is not  
convincing evidence for mental time travel beyond the current needs because it might  
have been manufactured merely as a means to satisfy a current drive (just as appears  
to be the case for the tai chimpanzees).  Although we may commit a type II error,  
current evidence does not support the idea that mental time travel beyond the current  
drive was present in H. habilis, even though the capacity to think ahead might have  
improved.  
     Evidence for mental time travel into a remote future is more convincing for Homo  
erectus.  With the emergence of H. erectus (about 1.6 million years ago) a more  
sophisticated, so-called Acheulian, tool culture occurred.  One of these tools was the  
biface handaxe whose production included a somewhat symmetrical removing of  
flakes from two sides of the stone core so that the tool became sharper and more  
pointed.  The manufacture of costly bifacial stone tools leads one to assume that they  
were not intended for one time use only, but were kept for future use, which would  
imply that the manufacturer has anticipated future needs for which this tool might be  
helpful.  In turn, the anticipation of multiple future uses could have been an incentive  
for the more time-consuming manufacture of more sophisticated, versatile and long- 
lasting tools.  However, H. erectus' Acheulian tool kit showed little further refinement  
for over a million years.  Perhaps H. erectus represents an intermediate stage of the  
evolution of mental time travel, in that simulation of future and past episodes was  
possible, but the generation of abstract semantic concepts and theories from this  
knowledge was still in its infancy (see table 1. above). 
     The earliest evidence for a consequential increase in flexibility and generativity is  
not stone tools, but the fact that about one million years ago H. erectus migrated from  
Africa to various parts of the Old World.  While migrations are generally nothing  
unusual, this one appears to be different because H. erectus moved into very distinct  
environments and quickly adapted to very diverse climates.  Instead of slow  
morphological adaptation (e.g. in size and fur, etc) H. erectus must have been able to  
manufacture an adequate ecological niche in alien ecological conditions that originally  
could not meet human needs (e.g. eventually through use of fire).  Our ancestors must  
have analyzed past experiences and predicted future environment-need constellations  
in order to respond with flexibility to varying demands and with the generativity  
necessary to alter the environment to meet their (future) needs.   
     With Homo sapiens neandertalensis (between 100,000-35,000 years ago) there is  
the first evidence for unrestricted mental time travel even beyond death. Burials and  
`bear cult' indicate early attempts to deal with the questions mental time travel  
inevitably confronts us with.  
     Finally modern humans (Homo sapiens sapiens) left clear evidence for the use of  
abstract semantic knowledge and theories about the world in the so-called  
`evolutionary explosion' (35,000-10,000 years ago) of technology and art.  This again  
increased exponentially with the invention of external symbolic memory storage (cf.  
Donald, 1991) six to four thousand years ago, enhancing accumulation of and access  
to knowledge about the world (including records of the past and prophecies about the  
future).  Recent revolutions in science, technology and information processing and  
transfer mark a further step in the evolution of humans' ability to understand and  
manipulate the world. 
     Over the last 2 million years human brain size has increased (encephalization),  
indicating the increasing importance of the cognitive apparatus for survival and  
reproductive success.  The limbic system, a brain structure concerned with basic needs  
which forms a major part of the brain in most mammals, became much less prominent  
in humans as indicated by its reduced size relative to the whole cortex.  This  
corresponds with the view (discussed above) that with mental time travel humans  
achieved extended cognitive control over their own drive management.  One structure  
that appears to be critical for these `higher' cognitive functions is the prefrontal cortex  
which is reciprocally connected to the limbic regions and to sensory association areas  
and appears to be responsible for the generation of action schemes and the temporal  
organization of behaviour (Fuster, 1989; Ingvar, 1985).  The `regio frontralis'  
constitutes 3.5% of the cat cortex, 17% of the chimpanzee cortex and 29% of the  
human cortex (Brodmann, 1912, cited in Fuster, 1989).  The prefrontal cortex in  
humans appears to be essential for mental time travel and some of its above discussed  
`by-products'.  The inability to consider the future appears to arise from lesions only  
to this area of the brain (Fuster, 1989, Ingvar, 1985).  New and goal-directed  
behaviour, especially if based on deliberation and choice, is often severely impaired  
(Fuster, 1989).  Ingvar (1985) refers to a `lack of future'; behaviour is dominated by  
present needs and stimuli, the here and now.  Resulting symptoms of prefrontal  
lesions may be lack of ambition, apathy, unawareness of behavioural consequences  
and moral values (Ingvar, 1985); effectively cancelling the advances induced by the  
emergence of mental time travel.  The late development of the prefrontal cortex in  
phylogeny (and its late functional commitment and myelination in ontogeny),  
supports the view that this area is involved in higher mental functions, of which the  
time aspect may be of crucial importance. 
      The last two million years have witnessed the progressive sophistication of a  
human weapon that no other animal can yet beat: a brain that can potentially  
anticipate, alter and react to whatever might happen in the future. 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
     Organisms have developed a variety of means enabling them to act now for the  
future.  Only the great apes, however, may have developed an awareness  
flexible, context-independent manner.  Such mental time travel in which the  
imagination is used to simulate possible future scenarios may, nonetheless, be limited  
in great apes.  The reviewed evidence does not support the idea that chimpanzees can  
mentally travel into a remote, virtually unlimited, future the way we can and  
frequently do.  According to the Bischof-Koehler hypothesis the extent of ape  
forethought is limited by an inability to imagine future drives or needs.  
     In the archaeological record the first evidence for future-need anticipation is  
associated with Homo erectus and unlimited forethought, even beyond death, can be  
inferred from artifacts associated with Homo sapiens.  As with the proposed  
development of mindreading and mental time travel into the past, mental time travel  
into the future might have gradually developed from simulated-episodic to more  
abstract-theoretical levels.  The `mental world' and the underlying cognitive apparatus,  
involving particularly the prefrontal cortex, became increasingly important.  Aspects  
of human's mental make-up, ranging from motivation to self-perception, changed  
accordingly.  Mental time travel is a fundamental feature of the human mind; without  
it, technology, language, morality and religion could not have evolved the way they  
did.  It seems that the ancient Greeks were right: it was indeed Prometheus (foresight)  
who brought about the changes that made us appear to stand between the worlds of the  
animals and those of the gods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Concluding Comments 
 
     The reviewed evidence suggests that unrestricted mental time travel is a  
characteristic unique to humans.  The discovery of the fourth dimension was probably  
a process of the last two million years, but each human has to re-discover it in  
childhood.  Mental simulation may be the underlying mechanism responsible for our  
success.  Given the essential status of mental time travel for many other cognitive  
functions, science may need to devote more attention to this human capacity if we  
ever want to understand the human mind, its evolution and development.    
 
 
Appendix A 
 
A Survey of Animal Foresight: 
 
A preliminary investigation of whether or not 
the Bischof-Koehler hypothesis 
is consistent with current knowledge about primates 
 
 
Introduction 
 
     The Bischof-Koehler hypothesis, which states that 
 
Animals cannot anticipate their own future states of need or drive, 
 
is difficult to test empirically.  Indeed it is impossible to demonstrate unequivocally  
that it is true, because any animal at any point in time may anticipate a future need and  
consequently all animals would need to be tested all the time.  One can only attempt  
to falsify the hypothesis (cf. Popper, 1934).  The first step in such an attempt is to  
review the studies that have been done.  The few published investigations focusing  
explicitly on primate foresight do not oppose the thesis in that they do not show that  
an animal anticipated future needs.  It is possible, however, that there are unpublished  
phenomena known to workers in the field that are unknown to those outside the field  
of primatology.  Therefore, the best and perhaps the only way of examining whether  
the Bischof-Koehler hypothesis is consistent with current knowledge is to ask those  
scientists who study primates (and other species) whether they have observed or know  
of any behaviour that may contradict the claim.  And so I did. 
     Byrne and Whiten (1987, 1990, 1992) used a similar research strategy to collect  
information about an aspect of primates that had previously not been studied  
anecdotes (Byrne & Whiten, 1990) is an important accumulation of otherwise  
neglected knowledge that led to the establishment of tactical deception as a  
phenomenon of primate behaviour.  Similarly, I thought, a survey on animal foresight  
might update the database on which to assess the Bischof-Koehler hypothesis by  
accumulating information that has not previously been brought together.  If the survey  
does not reveal evidence of foresight to refute the hypothesis, the conjecture that it is  
consistent with current knowledge becomes firmer.  Furthermore, the survey may help  
extending current knowledge by accumulating anecdotes relevant to the topic.  If  
further anecdotes of the kind of de Waal's observation of Franje (1982, see above,  
p.49) were to amass, it would threaten the hypothesis.  At least it would call (and  
perhaps set the stage) for perhaps more conclusive experimental inquiries.  A  
collection of anecdotes alone, however, may not provide a decisive answer to the  
question about the validity of the hypothesis (cf. Heyes, 1993).  Nonetheless, as some  
respondents attested (e.g. Byrne, Tutin), the survey appears to be the only feasible  
way of approaching the issue at this initial stage. 
     There are some essential differences between the gathering of anecdotes in Whiten  
and Byrne's (e.g 1988) exemplary study on tactical deception and the current search  
for anecdotes concerning the anticipation of future states of drive or need.  Tactical  
deception is a phenomenon that can be defined in behavioural terms (e.g. Whiten &  
Byrne, 1988).  By contrast, mental time travel, drive or need and anticipated drive or  
need are not directly observable.  As pointed out above, Bischof (1985) and Bischof- 
Koehler (1985) failed to provide a definition of what constitutes a drive or need.   
Since the scientific community has not been able to agree upon a common definition,  
it is not surprising that Rowell and Harcourt complain about this state of affairs in  
response to my request.  The other respondents appear to have relied on their common  
sense understanding of the terms.  In addition to the problem that drives cannot be  
observed directly, the possibility of concurrent multiple drives with different degrees  
of urgency and of interruption of drive behaviour complicate the issue.  Only  
experimental manipulations may be able to control these factors at least to a degree.   
Indeed, in Appendix B I will propose an experimental design that may solve these  
problems by controlling current and future drives.  While Byrne and Whiten (e.g.  
1991) used those anecdotes that met their own definition for inferences about possible  
underlying mental processes and capabilities, the current survey relies on inferences  
that the observers themselves make as to what constitutes evidence of future-need  
anticipation21.  Consequently, without a clear behavioural definition, the study can  
only be explorative in its nature.  Contributed anecdotes can only be observations of  
anticipatory behaviour that the respondent deems may entail mental representation of  
a future state of drive or need. 
     Anticipatory behaviour may be defined as any behaviour that becomes meaningful  
only in consideration of events that follow it.  In this sense nest building among birds  
is an anticipatory behaviour because this activity only makes sense in the light of  
future breeding.  This does not imply, though, that the actor (the bird) is aware or  
holds a mental representation of the future event.  Indeed, anticipatory behaviour may  
or may not be based on forethought and forethought may or may not manifest in  
anticipatory behaviour.  In the absence of language, mental processes such as  
forethought can only be inferred.  Such inferences should be guided by a comparison  
of the specific features that characterize different possible underlying mechanisms for  
anticipatory behaviour.  I will briefly rehearse the different mechanisms discussed  
above: 
 
1) Learning 
     Mechanisms of learning are mechanisms that can underlie anticipatory behaviour  
because learning as such makes sense only in the light of future use.  In classical  
conditioning, for example, the effectiveness of a CS (conditioned stimulus) is mainly  
dependent upon its quality as a reliable predictor of the UCS (unconditioned  
stimulus).  Time itself may even serve as a CS; that is, a dog may be conditioned to  
salivate prior to the appearance of food that is presented at regular intervals.   
Similarly, operant conditioning (law of effect) implies some form of expectancy of  
rewards or punishments.  Explanations of anticipatory behaviour based on learning  
require that the animal has had past experiences with the same or sufficiently similar  
situations.  Other conditions relevant to this kind of underlying mechanism of  
anticipatory behaviour are described in the findings amassed by behaviourists.   
 
2) Instinct 
     Anticipatory behaviour can result from genetically controlled mechanisms.  Such  
instinctual behaviour may not require any past experience (e.g. in the case of  
hibernation), although the inherent aspects may need environmental input and may be  
altered through this.  Instinctual anticipatory behaviours should be universal or at least  
common among members of the species.  The behaviour can be expected to be  
stereotypical (apart from learned modifications) and fixed to a particular domain.  In  
experiments the behaviour may be provoked through the presentation of isolated  
particular releasing factors. 
     
 
3) Coincidence 
     This category is not really related to an underlying mechanism of anticipatory  
behaviour but rather comprises those behaviours that may in retrospect look  
anticipatory, but whose functional origin was not related to the future events.   
Behaviour may turn out to be useful by sheer coincidence.  Such coincidences may,  
through mechanisms of category 1 or 4, become actual anticipatory behaviours.           
4) Representation of the future 
     Many human anticipatory behaviours are based on mental representation of  
possible future events (mental time travel).  While learning and instinct may be  
involved neither can alone nor in combination explain resulting behaviour.  Behaviour  
based on insight may be characterized through its transferability, flexibility and  
generativity.  Past experience with the situation may not be necessary and the  
resulting behaviour may not be shared with other conspecifics (Mental time travel is  
individual cognition and thus one can expect interindividually different resulting  
behaviour).  Only anticipatory behaviour that is based on mental time travel is  
relevant to the Bischof-Koehler hypothesis. 
 
     The dissociation of possible underlying mechanism for anticipatory behaviour  
cannot be conclusive if based solely on anecdotal evidence.  In addition, it has to be  
conjectured that in many cases more than just one mechanism is involved (e.g. a  
combination of learning and instinct) or the mechanisms are not as clear cut as they  
seem (see Gibson, 1990 and discussion above, p.40, 41).  With all these limitations  
and restrictions in mind the current survey should be viewed as a preliminary study of  
evidence that potentially could refute the Bischof-Koehler hypothesis.   
     Having pointed out some of the difficulties and weaknesses as well as the aims and  
potentials of the survey, I will now proceed to describe the survey and what it  
revealed. 
 
 
Method 
 
 
     The Request 
 
     In the initial stage of the survey (June 1993) the following letter was send to 73  
researchers: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
XXX... 
 
XXX... 
 
                              Dear X 
 
   I am a graduate student at the University of Waikato working under the supervision  
of Prof. Mike C. Corballis at the University of Auckland, and would greatly  
appreciate your help. 
 
 
 A SURVEY OF ANIMAL FORESIGHT 
 
   In 1917 Koehler wrote that " `the time in which the chimpanzee lives' is limited in  
past and future" (Koehler, 1917/1927, p.272). Bischof (1985) claims that an animal's  
anticipatory behavior is always connected to the current drive (need). The ability to  
represent a future beyond the context of the current drive might be a crucial feature in  
the development of homo. 
   Following discussion with Richard Byrne, I decided to adopt Whiten and Byrne's  
(1988) research strategy of collecting unpublished (anecdotal and experimental) data  
from experts in order to explore the null-hypothesis: animals cannot anticipate (pre- 
present) future environment-need constellations independent of the context of the  
current drive (need). 
   Apparently, humans can extrapolate themselves into an imagined future and can  
anticipate what needs they will have. For example, even when we are not thirsty we  
can anticipate our future thirst and we can act a priori in order to secure the fulfilment  
of the future need by, for instance, carrying water when walking through waterless  
areas. 
   I would be very grateful if you could send me any observational (anecdotal) or  
experimental data that may indicate that any animal (please specify by giving  
binominal names) has been able to anticipate its own future needs in this way, or, if  
you do not have such data, a note stating this for each species you are studying. You  
may add "negative evidence", i.e. clear cases of animals not anticipating beyond their  
current drive although such anticipations would have been beneficial. 
   If you are conducting experimental research, it would be of specific interest to me to  
receive data about success or failure in attempts to let the animal perform tasks that  
require anticipations of future needs, or attempts to teach the animal concepts (e.g.  
symbols that refer to an extended future) which imply such knowledge. 
   Some "foresight" behavior, such as manufacture of sticks at one place for later use  
for termite fishing at another out of sight place (e.g. Goodall, 1986), does not  
constitute future-need anticipations as long as the preparatory behavior and the  
consummatory act are in the context of the current drive. 
 
 
   
 
 
   If you have any data which may refute the null-hypothesis please specify the  
following: 
   - how did you know that the animal has cognitively anticipated future needs? 
   - Is it possible, from your knowledge of the species, that reasons other than       
 future pre-presentation could account for that behavior? 
   - Was the behavior that led to your inference observed more than once? If so,   
 please give each record fully, or, if observed many times, please give a   
 representative instance in detail and summarize the frequency and pattern. 
   - Do you have any evidence relevant to the ontogeny or phylogeny of that   
 behavior? 
   - How long (approximately) had you been observing the behavior of these   
 animals at the time of the instance(s)?   
   - Please give as many details as you can on experimental data. 
 
 
Please note that: 
 
   If there are any constraints, such as copyright, on the use to which I may put the  
 data, please tell me. 
   If you consider that your contribution includes any original ideas of your own,   
 and you would like this to be acknowledged, please make this clear. 
   My intention is to complete a catalogue of records, and acknowledge their   
 sources. However, if you do not wish your identity to be revealed in this   
 way, please tell me.  
   All contributors will be acknowledged in any ensuing publication and I would   
 be pleased to send a copy of the complete catalogue of records to anyone   
 who requests it. 
 
 
Please supply as much information and comment that you care to add! 
 
 
With kind regards 
 
            Thomas Suddendorf        
 
 
 
 
 
 
     In a second attempt, three months later, I asked for more anecdotes via the e-mail  
news group Primate Talk.  This second request was slightly altered in that I included  
de Waal's (1982) anecdote of the chimpanzee Franje (see above, p.49) in order to  
provided the researchers with a clearer idea of what kind of evidence would be  
relevant.   
 
 
     The Informants 
 
     In the initial study 73 researchers were personally contacted.  Four categories of  
potential informants were targeted:  Primatologists, the researchers who conducted  
projects attempting to teach `language' to great apes, comparative psychologists (ape- 
human) and researchers of non-primate species (dolphins & parrots). 
     57 primatologists were selected from the membership list of the International  
Primatological Society (kindly provided by Richard Byrne, April, 1993).  The  
selection was guided by criteria such as experience in the field and expertise in  
cognitive and behavioural aspects, rather than physiology, distribution or  
conservation.  These criteria were chosen in order to reach those experts most likely to  
be able to contribute relevant and reliable data.  For each major taxa specialists were  
contacted. 
     Representatives of all seven major `ape-language projects' received the request  
letter.  Furthermore, five well-known comparative psychologists specializing in ape's  
cognitive capacities and four researchers pioneering in the study of dolphin and parrot  
intelligence were personally contacted. 
     The second survey conducted via the Primate Talk network could potentially have  
reached up to 600 mainly American primatologists who subscribe to this newsgroup.  
 
 
Results 
 
     The results are presented in the form of numbered records.  A record comprises a  
particular contribution by one respondent. 
 
 
     Primatologists 
 
     Only three records derived from the second survey and these are incorporated in  
the presentation of the results of the primatologists who were personnally contacted.   
This presentation is structured according to taxa following the example of Byrne and  
Whiten (1990).   
 
      
STREPSIRHINI 
 
Lemur catta 
 
1.  Observer: A. Jolly 
 
     I don't actually think I could provide any [foresight anecdote] for lemurs. 
 
 
HAPLORHINI 
 
 
PLATYRRHINI [new world monkeys] 
 
 
Callithrix argentata  
 
2.  Observer: H. Buchanan-Smith 
 
     No incident seen.  [175 hours on three family groups in captivity] 
 
 
Cebulla pygmaea 
 
3.  Observer: C.T. Snowdon 
 
     Pygmy marmosets and other species of marmosets have dental adaptations that  
allow them to excavate holes in the bark of trees to extract plant exudate.  In the  
course of a four month field study in the Peruvian Amazon in 1978 I made extensive  
observations on a group of pygmy marmosets, and noted that they generally went to  
one of their sap trees soon after arising each morning. Their last actions at night  
before retiring to a sleeping site were to excavate at the tree.  I have personally  
interpreted this as anticipatory behavior-- that is sap doesn't run out immediately, and  
holes have to be excavated in advance, so at least the digging of sap holes could be  
called anticipatory behavior.  However, I have no data on whether digging holes was  
ever done without the animals at the same time feeding on holes that already  
contained sap.  These are the smallest monkeys in the world (ca. 90-100 g) and they  
have a high metabolic rate requiring feeding immediately before sleeping each night  
and immediately upon arising.  Thus I cannot argue that the hole digging was ever  
done when food motivation was not present or when feeding opportunities were not  
present.  The closest I could come to having marmosets fit your definition was that  
toward the end of the study, they used the two sap sources less and less frequently and  
began digging holes in other nearby trees.  The excavation of the first holes in a new  
tree is independent of food being present, but I'm not sure how I could ever argue that  
there was an absence of food motivation while the animals dug holes. 
     
 
Saguinus labiatus 
 
4.  Observer: H. Buchanan-Smith 
      
     No incident seen.  [500 hours on pairs and families in captivity] 
 
 
Saguinus fuscicollis 
 
5.  Observer: H. Buchanan-Smith 
 
 
Saguinus oedipus 
 
6.  Observer: H. Buchanan-Smith 
 
     No incident seen.  [200 hours on family group in captivity] 
 
 
 
CATARRHINI  
 
Cercopithecoidea [old world monkeys] 
 
Cercopithecus mitis 
 
7.  Observer: T.E. Rowell 
 
     I don't have any anecdotal evidence of "foresight", [and frankly I cannot imagine  
any anecdote which could possibly provide what you are looking for.] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Macaca fascicularis 
 
8.  Observer: M. Cords 
 
     No incident reported.  Does caching behavior in rodents and birds count as  
potential evidence of foresight? (Although I suspect we agree that it need not indicate  
mental representation of the future.) 
 
 
9.  Observer: F. Burton 
 
     No incident reported.  At best, the future exists as a goal currently held.  Seen after  
the fact, it appears that a non-human primate has developed a complex strategy over  
time to effect purpose:  there is no doubt that this is what actually occurs.  Rather, the  
memories evoked by an immediate image prompt the animal to perform.  Thus, in  
political machinations, the monkey acts today for an outcome or goal that is  
prospective; but the moment of its occurrence is always the present. (Burton, 1993,  
p.44)   
 
 
Papio hamadryas 
 
10. Observer: H. Kummer 
 
     No incident reported [Kummer forwarded the request to a colleague (Hemelrijke)  
who studies chimpanzees, because evidence concerning anticipatory behaviour is to  
be expected to come from apes (Hemelrijke).] 
 
 
11. Observer: S. Zuckerman             Negative evidence  
 
     F. Reynolds contributed the observation by S. Zuckerman (1932) of the  
introduction of an equal number of male and female baboons to Monkey Hill in  
London Zoo.  In their natural habitat hamadryas live in harem groups with surplus  
males moving around separately and not part of the breeding group.  Since the less  
dominant males could not get away in captive conditions, the story of Monkey Hill  
was total carnage as males competed to round up and hold onto as many females as  
possible, eventually destroying the colony completely.  If the male baboons had been  
able to bring reason and foresight to their predicament, they could have shared out the  
females equally and amicably. 
 
 
Hominoidea 
 
Pongo pygmaeus 
 
12. Observer: A. Russon 
  
     As far as I can see, they [orangutans] don't [think ahead] a whole lot.  Of the  
incidents I can think of, forethought only shows at the level of a few minutes from  
now or so.  [But then you know, if you don't really look it's amazing what you miss.] 
 
 
Gorilla gorilla 
 
13. Observer: A.H. Harcourt 
 
     Not aware of anything that you might want to term anticipation, [but then I'm not  
at all sure what would count as anticipation in your mind]. 
 
 
14. Observer: C.E.G. Tutin 
 
     We have been studying wild gorillas...at Lope in Gabon since 1984.  It is strikingly  
clear that they monitor the `behavior' of trees in the same way that we do and have a  
perfect understanding of the link between flowers and fruit.  For example, they so  
often arrive at a fig tree just as the fruit ripens and this is impressive as trees fruit  
asynchronously and at irregular intervals.  It's very hard to prove all this but it's so  
clear when we spend time in the forest and try to guess where the apes will be by  
studying trees.  It's painfully clear to us that the apes are a lot more skilled than we  
are!  Lowland gorillas eat fruit of at least 120 species and there is great variability in  
fruiting patterns but information on tree phenology is gathered, stored and processed  
and they go unerringly to the right place at the right time- sometimes travelling  
several kilometres to isolated trees.  May be this doesn't qualify as sceptics would  
argue that they wonder randomly driven by the current drive of hunger but there's  
food all over the place yet they go to their favourite food and must use foresight to  
work out the daily travel routes. 
 
 
 
 
Pan troglodytes 
 
15. Observer: R.W. Wrangham 
 
     I can think of no data from my observations of chimpanzees Pan troglodytes that  
falls into your category of foresight. [several thousands of hours at Gombe, Tansania  
and Kibale, Uganda] 
 
 
16. Observer: C.K. Hemelrijk 
 
     I must admit that I do not remember such instances. 
 
 
17. Observer: R.W. Byrne 
 
     Byrne and Byrne (1988) reported that a group of chimpanzees surrounded a cave in  
which a leopard and its infant had hid.  The group made excited noises and one old  
male, after several unsuccessful attempts, lunged into the cave once more and  
emerged with a very small leopard cub in his hand (p.24).  The chimpanzee group  
inspected, beat, bit and eventually killed the cub in a process that took some forty  
minutes.  However, they did not eat it but groom the body. This behaviour makes  
sense if one considers that a potential future predator had been terminated.  But did  
the chimpanzees have had this in mind when they began their extraordinary siege?   
Apart from this and perhaps the chimpanzee war anecdotes I cannot think of anything  
that may contradict the Bischof-Koehler hypothesis.  Indeed, considering current  
knowledge, I believe the assumption is on firm ground. [verbal communication, April,  
1993] 
 
 
 
 
     The `Ape-Language' Projects 
 
 
      Premack and Miles failed to respond, and the Gardners, Patterson and Savage- 
Rumbaugh excused themselves because of too heavy a workload.  However, Savage- 
Rumbaugh pointed out that she has anecdotes regarding anticipation of and  
communication about future needs and kindly forwarded my request to her  
collaborator K. Brakke. 
 
18. Observer: K. Brakke           [project Austin, Kanzi, Panbanisha & Panzee ?] 
 
     We have raised the apes (to date three Pan pansicus and one Pan troglodytes) from  
infancy in an environment that closely resembles that of a human child..... we do not  
have a symbol that indicates future tense....Certainly, the language learning process  
itself appears to involve some anticipatory capacity.  One of the functions of language  
is to provide a means of predicting (or negotiating) what is going to happen....the apes  
appear able to take in anticipatory information and act accordingly, even if what we  
end up doing is not what they "want" to do.  In this sense, they seem able to "predict"  
things that don't arise from their current "drive".  They also seem to be able to "put  
off" their drive if we tell them we will take care of it "later" -- they seem to have some  
sense of "later" versus "no" if we decide not to pursue their wishes at the moment. 
 
 
19. Observer: K. Brakke           [project Kanzi] 
 
     Kanzi of his own accord has started helping us clean out his enclosure in the  
evenings by pushing food scraps out of tight corners and into the drain canal.  This  
expedites the cleaning process and lets us move on to the next step of the evening  
routine which may be distribution of blankets or bowls of crushed ice (a favorite  
evening treat).  Kanzi is probably helping because he wants his ice or blankets, but he  
is clearly understanding that those events do not come about until cleaning is  
completed and is acting to facilitate something that is not directly related to his sleep  
or thirst "drive".  Similarly, several of our apes will finish their computer tasks so that  
they can go play chase afterwards. 
 
 
20. Observer: R. Fouts             [project Tatu] 
 
     We have had only two examples of this [sense of time] and they were two years  
and nine months apart.... We make it a general rule here to celebrate all birthdays and  
holidays...We always get the [Christmas] tree and decorate it on the weekend  
following the Thursday of Thanksgiving....the Christmas tree is a favourite topic of  
conversation with the chimpanzees, and they refer to it with a sign combination they  
devised - CANDY TREE....On the Friday following Thanksgiving in 1989 it began to  
snow outside, and it was on this occasion that Tatu asked the following  
question:`CANDY TREE?'  This impressed us a great deal because it could be  
interpreted that Tatu not only remembered the Christmas tree but also knew that this  
was the season for it, which is temporal perception.  However, we were also aware  
that this was but a single observation of this type of behaviour, and it was not until  
August 1991 that we made a second observation of a similar instance of behaviour.   
As mentioned, we also celebrate all the birthdays each year.  We have two birthdays  
right next to each other: Debbi Fouts' birthday is on the first of August and Dar's is on  
the second.  This year we celebrated Debbi's birthday with treats and birthday songs as  
usual.  Later that day, in the afternoon, Tatu asked `DAR ICE CREAM?'  Ice cream is  
often part of the birthday celebrations, and it appears that Tatu may have been aware  
of what came after Debbi's birthday.   
(Fouts & Fouts, 1993, p. 38) 
 
 
21. Observer: R. Fouts             [project Washoe]    negative evidence 
         
     Arnold Chamove remembered that R. Fouts told him a few years ago that he tried  
to teach words referring to the future to Washoe.  This was unsuccessful; Washoe did  
not seem to understand.  To my request for verification of this report Roger Fouts  
wrote: In regard to Arnold's citation that we taught Washoe signs for the future are  
technically incorrect.  What we did do was use signs indicating the future around her,  
none of which we have observed her to acquire.  So we did not intentionally try to  
teach her any of these signs. 
 
 
22. Observer: H. Terrace          [project Nim Chimpsky] 
 
     I am unable to provide any positive incidences of animal foresight that show  
autonomy from a "current drive" or preparatory behavior for a consummatory act. 
 
 
 
 
     Comparative Psychologists 
 
 
     None of the five comparative experts replied to the request. 
 
 
 
 
     Researchers of Non-Primate Species    
 
 
Dolphins 
 
23. Observer: D.A. Helweg 
 
     I cannot think of any incident in which dolphins provide evidence for anticipations  
of future needs.  The special conditions of marine observation make the investigation  
of such issues difficult. (verbal communication, July, 1993) 
 
 
24. Observer: L.M. Herman 
 
     I am sorry, but I have no reprints relevant to your request. 
 
 
Parrots 
 
25. Observer: I.M. Pepperberg 
 
     I have read your letter concerning animal foresight and have passed it around my  
laboratory.  The conclusion that my students and I have reached is that, given your  
criteria for foresight, no examples exist for animals and probably not even for young  
children. 
 
 
These records are the result of all responses received until December the 10th 1993. 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
     None of the respondents pointed to an established piece of knowledge that clearly  
falsifies the Bischof-Koehler hypothesis.  However, five respondents contributed  
observations of anticipatory behaviour that they deemed may be relevant.  The  
ensuing six records are individually discussed in order of presentation.  While  
anecdotes in principal may not falsify the hypothesis, they may shed light on the  
trustworthiness of the claim we call Bischof-Koehler hypothesis.  
     Snowdon provided the only potential evidence for new world monkeys (record 6).   
The sap extraction phenomenon is based on prior excavation of holes in the bark of  
trees.  The initial digging of holes is an anticipatory behaviour because it becomes  
meaningful only in relation to future sap extraction.  This does not require that the  
animal be aware about the meaning of the behaviour or that the animal have a mental  
picture of the future.  Snowdon himself pointed out that this observation does not  
constitute evidence for future-need anticipation.  Since the behaviour is shared among  
many individuals and the behaviour has an apparent (learning) history, explanations  
based on learned or inherent factors seem likely.  On the other hand flexibility,  
generativity or transferability are not reported and there is consequently no support for  
an explanation based on mental time travel.  This is not to say that we can exclude the  
possibility that the marmosets do indeed anticipate their future hunger, but because of  
plausible alternative explanations we cannot consider this observation as evidence  
against the Bischof-Koehler hypothesis. 
     While no potential evidence has been contributed for old world monkeys, five  
records pertain to the behaviour of apes.  Tutin provided the only one for Gorillas  
(record 14).  The phenomenon of gorillas appearing to arrive at trees that have ripe  
fruit seems to involve forethought and perhaps even future-need anticipation.  Indeed,  
Tutin is convinced that gorillas can anticipate future needs.  The existence of mental  
maps has been evidenced for chimpanzees (Boesch & Boesch, 1984) and may well  
exist in gorillas, too (see discussion above, p.52, 53).  Tutin's claim that apes may  
have a temporal map in addition to a spatial one is, however, a suggestion that has not  
been evidenced but is based on the personal impression that the gorillas go unerringly  
to the right place at the right time.  
     But is this a planned behaviour or does it only appear that way in the eyes of the  
observer?  Tutin informs us that lowland gorillas eat fruit of at least 120 species.  The  
likelihood of encountering a favourite fruiting tree independent of where one chooses  
to travel might be higher than Tutin assumes.  Tutin tries to dismiss this "sceptic's"  
interpretation by pointing out that there is food all over the place, yet the apes go to  
their favourite food.  But how can we know this?  We can only decide what their  
favourite fruit of the day is when we observe them eating it.  I agree with Tutin that  
apes have more than plain hunger, they have appetite.  They may prefer X over Y but  
after enough of X they may develop some desire for Y (cf. Premack's principal,  
Premack, 1959).  So, if they have an appetite for bananas, say, they may go to places  
where there are banana trees (with the help of their spatial memory).  If they see some  
other ripe fruit on the way, say a fruiting fig tree, they may or may not change their  
minds (depending on their need for nutrition and the evaluation of that food in  
comparison to other available food) and eat those.  This may not involve any  
anticipation of future needs and may be partly the reason why the researchers often  
fail to predict the whereabouts of the gorillas by studying trees.   
     The interesting point of Tutin's contribution is not the claim about a planned daily  
travel route, but rather the possibility that the apes actually study trees to predict when  
the fruit will be eatable.  If that is the case it may mean that they anticipate the future  
appetite for these fruits.  Alternatively, however, just as it is probably the case in the  
acquisition of mental maps in rodents (see above, p.53), the information might be  
gathered and stored without the future need in mind.  Nevertheless, it would certainly  
be valuable to study explicitly whether apes can form temporal maps, especially in  
relation to events that occur asynchronously and at irregular intervals, such as the  
ripening of fruit on a fig tree. 
     As yet, however, as Tutin admits, the potential alternative explanations do not  
allow this contribution to be considered as strong evidence against the Bischof- 
Koehler hypothesis.  It is to be hoped, though, that this research programme will be  
picked up soon.  Perhaps gorillas do intentionally study trees whose fruit they fancy.   
Indeed, it could be argued that in circumstances of food shortage such an ability  
would be favoured by natural selection.  This might even be the selective pressure that  
supported the development of mental time travel in early hominids. 
     Byrne contributed an extraordinary observation of chimpanzees stealing a leopard  
cub from its mother and killing it (record 17).  The question of whether or not the  
chimpanzees had in mind that they were terminating a future predator cannot be  
answered.  It is difficult to think of alternative explanations for this remarkable  
behaviour.  However, the chimpanzees themselves seem not to have been sure about  
what they were doing.  Their behaviour was inconsistent and discrepant: the killing of  
the cub was a long process and not a determined action and the same animals who  
dropped the cub from trees investigated and groomed the body (an expression of  
affection).  An explanation of this anecdote based on collective anticipation and  
reasoning is consistent with the observation, but requires a far more elaborate  
understanding of time then has previously been considered.  Alternatively, the  
behaviour might have been driven by an unconscious motive, similar to de Waal's  
(1982, see above, p.52) explanation of Luid's strategic politics, or it may have had  
nothing to do with the future at all.  Byrne himself favoured these alternative  
explanations and agreed that there is no convincing evidence for future-need  
anticipation in animals.   
     The last three records derived from chimpanzees involved in the `ape-language'  
projects.  Brakke (record 18) points out that the acquisition of language inherently  
provides a means of predicting what is going to happen.  The chimpanzees appear to  
understand a difference between the answers "later" and "no".  This, however, can be  
readily explained in terms of operant conditioning: the stimulus "later" results in  
delayed reinforcement and the stimulus "no" is not followed by reinforcement.  Such a  
discrimination problem should be expected to be solvable by chimpanzees and does  
not require the involvement of future-need anticipation.  Indeed, it is debatable  
whether the ape's `language' performance itself is anything but problem solving (cf.  
debate in Griffin, 1981) 
     The second observation contributed by Brakke (record 19) also appears to be best  
explained in terms of learned behavioural contingencies.  Kanzi helps to clean his  
enclosure to get the reward (crushed ice or blankets) more quickly.  And the computer  
tasks are finished in order to receive the reward of free play.  Although these  
behaviours can involve representations of the future, we do not have any information  
box.   
If these records are the data Savage-Rumbaugh referred to as evidence for  
future-need anticipation, then she misunderstood the request.  These records do not  
contradict the Bischof-Koehler hypothesis. 
     Fouts reports two instances (record 20) that may indicate a sense of time.  The  
chimpanzee Tatu signed two `sentences' that seem to refer to an event that is about to  
happen (the following day).  Although it is possible that these questions (CANDY  
TREE?; DAR ICE CREAM?) were asked by chance, it appears reasonable to assume  
that they do indeed refer to the future event.  This is, however, a long way from  
arguing that this confirms a sense of time.  A concept of abstract time and temporal  
associations (category 1 above) are quite different.  Tatu might have learned the  
association between two events (Thanksgiving and Candy Tree; Debbi's celebration  
day and Dar's celebration day).  This is an astonishing feat of learning, since the trials  
occur only at yearly intervals.  Yet, the events are apparently very special and  
emotionally loaded, so that it is not so surprising that only a few trials over a long  
period (years) are sufficient to establish the association.  It is a pity that Fouts could  
not report a subsequent conversation with Tatu which may have illuminated what  
exactly was on his mind when he was asking these questions.   
     While some very interesting anecdotes have been contributed, none resembles the  
kind of behaviour displayed by Franje (de Waal, 1982).  The expected substantiation  
of de Waal's anecdotal evidence did not happen.  Instead, two records (11 & 21)  
comprise `negative evidence'. 
     It is interesting to note that the `ape-language' projects have apparently not resulted  
in the apes acquiring words for the future (or future tense), although, at least in Fouts'  
laboratory (record 21), such signs are used by the researchers interacting with the  
apes.  Such negative evidence may not be very definitive.  Indeed, it does not have  
much epistemological value because we can only falsify but not verify the hypothesis.   
This pitfall becomes even clearer when we consider the other negative evidence  
contributed by Reynolds (record 11).  She pointed to the observations of Zuckerman  
(1932).  Reynolds remarks that reason and foresight could have prevented the  
disastrous self-destruction following the introduction of equal numbers of male and  
female baboons to Monkey Hill at London Zoo.  Even so, it does not follow that the  
catastrophe evidences the absence of reason and foresight.  We humans evidently have  
the ability to travel mentally in time and to reason along rational lines, yet we engage  
in wars and self-destructive activities that fly in the face of rational thought and  
foresight.  In short, absence of evidence is not evidence for absence.  Even thousands  
of records of negative evidence substantiating the hypothesis would be overturned  
with the acceptance of the validity of one positive record.   
     Nevertheless, it is relevant to consider the numerical distribution of the responses.   
It has to be conjectured, though, that many of the contacted researchers who are not  
aware of any positive evidence did not reply for that very reason.   
     In contrast to the 5 respondents whose contributions were discussed above, 15  
respondents wrote to state that they are not aware of any evidence that may contradict  
the Bischof-Koehler hypothesis.  The experts on lemurs, old world monkeys, dolphins  
and parrots22 all declared this.  Apart from Snowdon's observation of marmosets  
(record 3, see discussion above) this is also true for new world monkeys.  Thus, the  
most questionable issue remains the potential ability of apes.  But even here, the four  
respondents who contributed observations are opposed by five researchers who state  
that in spite of their long experience in observing apes they are not aware of anything  
that could support the view that apes anticipate future states of drive or need.   
Contrary to Tutin's (and Savage-Rumbaugh's) statements, three respondents (Burton,  
Byrne & Pepperberg) clearly expressed their belief that the Bischof-Koehler  
hypothesis is consistent with current knowledge.  Frances Burton, with her published  
statement: "At best, the future exists as a goal currently held" (1993, p.44; record 9)  
did in effect paraphrase the writings of Koehler (1917/1927), Bischof (1978, 1985)  
and Bischof-Koehler (1985).  
 
 
Concluding Comments 
 
     Although the majority of respondents wrote to attest to absence of evidence, the  
survey does not (and cannot in principal) verify the Bischof-Koehler hypothesis.  On  
the other hand, the few records potentially contradicting the hypothesis are not strong  
enough to falsify it.  Suggestive anecdotes were not substantiated by further  
observations of similar behaviour (e.g. of the Franje type).  While most of the  
contributed observations of anticipatory behaviour can easily be explained in other  
terms than future-need anticipation, some leave us puzzled (notably Byrne's record:  
17).  Tutin's account (record 14), it is to be hoped, will result in specific inquiries in  
the possibility of the existence of temporal maps in apes.  In the absence of such  
research, the results of this preliminary survey substantiate the claim that the Bischof- 
Koehler hypothesis is consistent with current knowledge.  The most important  
outcome of this project (the records as well as the discussions with experts) has been  
the reassurance that I, without personal experience in primatology, have not  
overlooked a realm that shows future-need anticipation in non-human primates.   
Indeed, until there is evidence to the contrary, parsimony demands that we accept the  
Bischof-Koehler hypothesis. 
     However, further research is necessary.  In the light of limited numbers of  
responses, more records need to be compiled.  In fact, the survey is continuing23.   
While this may result in a more comprehensive database on primate forethought,  
experimental research is also needed in order to attempt falsification of the hypothesis.   
In Appendix B I will outline an experimental paradigm that may provide proof for  
future-need anticipation.  
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Appendix B 
 
An experimental paradigm 
for the investigation of future-need anticipation 
 
 
Introduction 
 
     In order to test the Bischof-Koehler hypothesis one has to provide the subjects with  
the opportunity to anticipate future states of drive or need.  This requires not only that  
we set the stage for possible anticipation, but also that we arrange to observe this in a  
way that excludes alternative explanations.  We need access to, or control over, mental  
states which are usually not directly observable or measurable, viz. forethought,  
drive/need and anticipated drive/need.  The operationalization can be based on the  
following criteria. 
     Mental time travel can be dissociated from other reasons for anticipatory behaviour  
on the basis of specific characteristics (see Appendix A above).  Learning  
explanations (category 1) can be excluded if the subjects are not given the opportunity  
to learn the anticipatory behaviour; that is, only success in the first trial of the  
experimental situation can be used to dismiss learning explanations.  Instinctual  
explanations (category 2) can be dismissed if the subjects are confronted with a novel  
task that does not involve behaviour that is typical for the species.  Anticipatory  
behaviour that is the product of sheer coincidence (category 4) can be excluded on  
statistical grounds; that is, many subjects may need to be tested or many alternative  
options need to be provided.  Finally, variations of the original experiment may be  
able to show flexibility, generativity and transferability, which would substantiate a  
mental time travel explanation. 
     Homoeostatic needs (e.g. hunger, thirst) may be controllable through manipulation  
of the input factors.  These needs can be assumed to be fulfilled in conditions where  
plenty of food and drink are available.  Deprivation of essential factors brings the  
homoeostatic system out of balance and inevitably results in increasing need for this  
factor (e.g. liquid).  The ethical problem and distress associated with deprivation  
might be reduced by short term deprivation with concurrent drive enhancers (e.g. salty  
food produces thirst more quickly).  
     Future needs can be created by controlling what is going to happen (e.g. salty food  
and drink deprivation).  But it is necessary to provide the subject with means by which  
they can predict these need-evoking circumstances.  Regular occurrence of the same  
procedure or distinct cues can provide the subjects with these means. 
     The following experimental paradigm is designed to fulfil all of the criteria  
outlined above.   
 
 
 
Suggested Experiment 
 
     On a regular basis subjects are brought into room A for a certain amount of time  
until moved into room B.  Both rooms are reserved for pretraining and experimental  
condition only.  In the pretraining condition the subject in room A will have its needs  
taken care of (e.g. plenty of drinks).  Before moving on to room B the subject is given  
the choice between several items (e.g. toys, but no drinks) of which it can take one  
into room B.  In room B the subject is deprived from any liquid but given a salty treat  
(e.g. potato chips).  Several measures may need to be taken in order to determine  
when a sufficient level of thirst is achieved.  This procedure has to be repeated on a  
regular basis, and/or with distinct room cues (e.g. blue room A and green room B) for  
a certain period. 
     The experimental condition is the introduction of a familiar drink container among  
the items from which the subjects can choose in room A before going into room B.   
To avoid interference of a novelty factor resulting in the preference of the drink, all  
items in the experimental condition may be new.  The question is whether the subjects  
tend to choose the drink item at more than a chance level. This can be shown by  
comparing the results with a control condition in which the drink is offered among  
other items, while the controls are not subject to drink deprivation in room B.  If a  
significant number of, for example, chimpanzee subjects choose the drink item on the  
first trial of the experimental condition it is reasonable to argue that they anticipated  
the future thirst.  Explanations in terms of learning, instinct and coincidence can be  
dismissed.  And since in room A all needs are taken care of (e.g. plenty of drinks) the  
possibility of an already present drive can be rejected. 
     The test only has epistemological value if its outcome is positive.  If the subjects  
fail to choose the drink item other explanations then absence of the capability to  
anticipate future needs are possible.  A positive outcome, however, would falsify the  
Bischof-Koehler hypothesis because future-need anticipation would have been  
demonstrated. 
     The potential of this paradigm is not limited to testing this hypothesis.  Besides  
using apes and monkeys as subjects, it would be interesting to test children.  The  
question of when children become able to anticipate future needs could be addressed.   
This may become very important for future research because it could provide the  
empirical means of studying the development of humans' cognitive motive organizer  
(CMO, see above, p.56, 57; and Suddendorf, 1992).  When do humans become able to  
decide about their current motivation, rather than being driven by whatever motive is  
present?  When do we begin to travel mentally into the future and develop a `freedom  
of will' that enables us to suppress current drives and needs in favour of goals that lie  
in the remote future?  Beginning with this proposed experimental design many critical  
questions raised in this paper could be addressed empirically. 
     Extrapolating from the current knowledge discussed above it has to be conjectured  
that apes, monkeys and children younger than three and a half years will fail to pass  
the test.  But experiments are done to add facts, whether expected or not, to our  
theories.           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C 
 
 
Epilogue 
 
     I would like to add a few final words to this research.  A problem many people  
have with biological or evolutionary accounts of human nature is the fact that  
evolutionary arguments have often been abused as a justification for the status quo  
(e.g. in the areas of sexism, racism and any kind of discrimination).  Humans are,  
however, not merely governed by nature (e.g. drives) but can, through access to the  
fourth dimension, make decisions about the future based on moral and ethic  
considerations.   
     Examining the difference between humans and animals might be misunderstood as  
trying to justify human superiority.  In fact, however, my intention is quite the  
opposite.  Recent research strongly supports Darwin's idea of a continuity of mental  
experience (even though metamorphotic quantum leaps may create a different  
impression).  The other great apes are most likely aware of the mental world (cf.  
Suddendorf, 1993).  Genetic research suggests that we are more closely related to  
chimpanzees than chimpanzees are to gorillas (Gibbons, 1990).  And even the social  
behaviour of apes appears to mirror human behaviour more closely than had been  
expected a few years ago.  De Waal (1989), for example, noted that bonobos have a  
human-like sex life (face to face sexual intercourse, lesbian and gay interactions) and  
Goodall (e.g. 1986) was the first to report chimpanzee wars. 
In the light of increasing evidence for animal intelligence and similarities between the  
other great apes and ourselves, it is the search for the small but significant changes  
that caused us to appear so different that fascinates me.  Instead of attributing the  
difference between humans and animals to some divine origin, rational scientific  
approaches begin to unwrap the myths that distort our self-image.  But science can  
hardly slip out of the dilemma of providing arguments for moral issues and of  
evaluating something as good or bad even if there is no scientific backup for this.  In  
respect to evolution, Festinger (1983) pointed out, for example, that there is no useful  
English word to describe the sequence through the millennia without a connotation of  
better or worse.  To a certain degree, evolution is like a Rorschach test, as Mike  
Corballis put it to me.  The observer, just as much as the picture, determines what he  
or she sees.  So I am perhaps overemphasizing the mental time travel aspect of human  
evolution.  But for two reasons I feel quite happy about that.  First, this aspect has  
been widely neglected and needs to be brought back into the discussion.  Second,  
whether or not the discovery of the fourth dimension was a prime mover in human  
evolution, the time aspect of our thinking is certainly a crucial part of the way we are  
today.  
     So my interpretation is that, with awareness of time, humans are the only species  
that can change and destroy the Earth and the only species that can experience the  
moral responsibility to do something about it.  I want to point out explicitly that these  
proposals are no justification for human's moral right to exploit animals or nature, but  
to the contrary, in my opinion, it gives us the moral responsibility to channel our  
impact in a way that protects the future of our planet and of all those creatures that do  
not even know what tomorrow is.           
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Notes 
 
     1 Most of the animal research that is elaborated in this paper is focused on primates  
although the pioneering work of scholars like Herman on dolphins and Pepperberg on  
parrots may surprise the scientific community with evidence for novel intelligence in  
non-primate species.  However, for a discussion of human evolution the study of our  
closest relatives appears to be primarily important. 
     2 However, since the production and use of early human stone tools (i.e. Oldowan  
tools) are within the competence of chimpanzees, even this latest definition of  
human's unique capacity to use tools can be disputed (e.g. Wynn & McGrew, 1989;  
see also Toth, Schick, Savage-Rumbaugh, Sevik & Rumbaugh, 1993, for the  
performances of a bonobo in recent investigations on semi-guided stone tool  
production). 
     3 The term rudimentary in evolutionary biology refers to features that were once  
fully developed but have since degenerated (e.g. human body hair can be viewed as a  
rudiment of fur).  However, many scholars have used the term in the sense of `not  
fully developed' or `elementary' without implying that the feature was once fully  
developed.  Although the term loses a major aspect of its specific meaning, I adopt the  
more general use of the term rudimentary without implying anything about the  
phylogeny of the feature. 
     4 The fact that as yet only one home-reared gorilla has proven to us the ability of  
self-recognition in a mirror, has provoked much speculation.  Povinelli (1993) argued  
recently that gorillas might have lost the ability of self-recognition and that Patterson's  
gorilla (Koko) does perform well on the mirror task only because the experimenters'  
intervention (instruction in American Sign Language and other tutoring) resulted in  
the expression of an apparently lost ancestral psychological trait.  This speculation  
rests on the assumption that since orangutans display self-recognition, the common  
ancestor of the great apes must have evolved the capacity for self-recognition (i.e. the  
feature is homologous in present day apes).  An alternative explanation would be that  
this ability emerged independently (analogous through convergence) in orangutans  
and humans and chimpanzees, while not in gorillas.  However, it may also be that all  
gorillas have the potential ability but our experimental techniques have as yet failed to  
show this in other individuals than Koko. 
     5 It has been argued that self-awareness may exist in different degrees in different  
animals (e.g. Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990).  The fact that vervet monkeys, for example,  
recognize their own rank in social hierarchies or that baboons yawn less often when  
among conspecifics (but not when alone) if they have rotten teeth, may be interpreted  
as representing some form of self-awareness.  However, the ability to recognize one's  
own visual image may be understood as representing a qualitatively different stage of  
self-awareness; a metamorphosis at one end of a continuum of degrees of self- 
awareness. 
     6 H.M. can recall some episodes from about 16 years before the operation which  
led to his amnesia.  However, these stories are highly stereotyped.  He is apparently  
unable to `update' these memories (Ogden & Corkin, 1991).  He recalls them, like  
semantic knowledge, without any further reconstruction. 
     7 Such reconstructions may demand cognitive abilities that animals lack.  Gardner  
(1975, cited in Marshall, 1982), for example, argued that only a language-possessing  
species has the semantic ability to structure event memories into a history.  However,  
the tendency to view all higher abilities of the human mind as secondary properties or  
by-products of the evolution of language has been criticized (e.g. Premack, 1988).   
Indeed, I will argue below that the ability to mentally travel in time might have been  
necessary for the evolution of language, although the question of which came first is a  
difficult one and may constitute a chicken-and-egg problem. 
     8 A similar finding has been reported for memory of dream events.  Active  
reconstruction of the chronology of dream events results in an order that often differs  
from the sequence revealed through spontaneous report/retrieval (Foulkes & Schmidt,  
1982). 
     9 Usher and Neisser (1993) reported recently that some important events of early  
life (hospitalization and birth of a sibling) are remembered by adult subjects even if  
they were only two years old at the time of the event.  Loftus (1993), however, argues  
that this finding should not change our assumptions about the termination of  
childhood amnesia which generally begins between age three and four.  
     10 Other scholars advocate, however, that young children do hold an actual  
`theory' of mind. Gopnik (1993), for example, argues that children may have a  
`Gibsonian theory of mind': they hold the theory that the real thing in the world is  
directly transferred into the representation of it in the mind.  Current data do not allow  
for a conclusive decision between `theory theories' and `simulation theories'.  
     11 Kinsbourne (1989) argued similarly that Korsakoff patients' amnesia may be the  
result of their difficulties in escaping from the influence of the present mental state  
and the state of the world.  He showed that the amnesics are "tied to the episode that  
happens to be" (Kinsbourne, 1989, p.184).  Recapturing previous experiences appears  
impossible if one cannot detach from the present one.  The patients' inability to  
envisage a future is congruent with the explanation that escaping the control of the  
present state is impossible; this will be discussed in the next section. 
     12 This appears to be a general pattern of cognitive development.  Studies on  
children's conversation with adults, for example, have shown that children's responses  
shift gradually from an anecdotal (episodic) to an abstract psychological level between  
     13 This would be consistent with Premack's (1988) rule of thumb that states that  
what three and a half year olds cannot do cannot be done by chimpanzees.  Such an  
assumption does not imply that chimpanzees are developmentally arrested children  
(cf. Povinelli, 1993). Species-specific differences in mental capacities surely exist.  A  
three and a half year old child will not, for example, outperform chimpanzees on  
mental map tasks.  However, if we are to investigate whether chimpanzees have the  
human ability to mentally travel in time it is reasonable to ask whether chimpanzees  
master the steps that humans have to master in their process of acquiring that ability.  
     14 These mental processes can themselves be stored in memory, mainly as  
semantics or separate mental episodes, but sometimes as part of the event that has  
been reflected upon.  Later reconstructions of that event may therefore be different  
(see reconstruction above) which can, for example, cause problems with the reliability  
of eye-witnesses in court.  The fact that suggestive questions can have impact on  
memory reconstruction is well known (e.g. Loftus & Loftus, 1975). 
     15 Learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975) is a result of breaking this contingency. 
     16 The ease by which humans can create new motives and needs becomes most  
apparent in today's world of advertisement.  Needs can be suggested.  We can not only  
achieve a certain control over our own needs, but we can also attempt to control the  
needs of others.  
     17 Festinger (1983) argued that humans tried (and still try) to control just about  
everything.  Only in retrospect may we distinguish between `natural' and `religious'  
technologies; for early humans they were probably the same: e.g. making fire and  
making rain. 
     18 The debate about how close humans and chimpanzees are genetically continues  
(Gibbons, 1990) and will not settle until mapping of both species' genetic code is  
completed. 
     19 Even if evidence for chimpanzee's mental time travel into remote futures were  
to accumulate, mental time travel might still have been a prime mover in human  
evolution that first emerged after the phylogenetic split from chimpanzees.  Just as it  
is inappropriate to generalize directly from our knowledge of contemporary hunter- 
gatherers to the life of say Homo erectus, so it may be faulty to generalize from the  
cognitive abilities of contemporary chimpanzees to what distinguished early homo  
from its chimp relative.  Indeed, present-day chimpanzees, like humans, have had  
about 5 to 8 million years of evolution since our common ancestors developed into  
distinct species.  While chimpanzees in the Tai forest have developed a culture that  
uses stones as hammer and anvil, other chimpanzee groups have not and it would be  
inappropriate to assume that chimpanzees four million years ago did have such a stone  
tool culture.  This could mean that some human-like characteristics (such as mental  
time travel) are present in rudimentary form in modern chimpanzees, but are relatively  
recent acquisitions that are analogous and not homologous to the human feature.   
Premack (1983) argued, for example, that the cognitive ability to use relational  
distinctions may only emerge in chimpanzees with language training and the  
intervention of the human species. 
     20 The oldest stone tools may also be attributed to a transitional form from  
australopithecus and homo because the dating of these tools seems to be earlier than  
that of Homo habilis. 
     21 Harcourt and Rowell, for example, stated that they could not imagine what kind  
of observation is relevant.  This led to the inclusion of the Franje anecdote in the  
second request. 
     22 The focus of this study was on primates because of their relevance to theories of  
human evolution.  The few researchers of non-primate species have been contacted  
mainly out of personal interest but also because Bischof (1985) and Bischof-Koehler  
(1985) did not restrict their hypothesis to primates.  However, I have to admit that the  
title `a survey of non-human primate foresight' rather than animal foresight would  
have been more appropriate and was indeed adopted in the second survey conducted  
via Primate Talk.  
     23 The request is published in the January 1994 edition of the Laboratory Primate  
Newsletter and in an article submitted for pubication I ask readers to contribute more  
observations.  Furthermore, I plan to attend at the XVth congress of the International  
Primatological Society in Bali August 1994 at which I intend to collect and discuss  
data directly with the primatologists. 
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